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Part I. General overview of consumer credits secured by immovables 
Do people generally buy or rent their homes? Is there any clear reason for it? 
Homeownership and tenancy are by far the most common land tenures in Europe1. 
The former is widespread in Spain (in 2015, 47% were owners with no outstanding 
mortgage or mortgage loan, and 31.2% were owners with a mortgage or loan), 
whereas the latter plays a minor role (it accounted for 21.8%). The reasons underlying 
such reality are manifold, but the most noteworthy are the following. On the one 
hand, Spanish housing policies have encouraged homeownership during the last 
decades, for instance through public incentives such as tax benefits.2 This approach 
changed tack however with the State Housing Plan 2013-2016,3 whereby tenancy has 
become the cornerstone of the State’s public housing policies. On the other hand, the 
reform of the 1994 Urban Leases Act4 (by Law 4/2013) has reduced tenants’ stability, 
so that Spanish law seems to be following an opposite path to other European 
countries where tenancy is a real alternative to homeownership (e.g. Germany or 
Switzerland).5 As a result, tenancy is still not a priority for Spanish households (68% of 
those interviewed by Fotocasa –a well-known Spanish real estate agency- prefer being 
homeowners than tenants).6 Be that as it may, the generalisation of homeownership 
has been one of the reasons behind the international economic crisis,7 which has led 
to a number of relevant (negative) consequences in Spain, as discussed below. 
What types of credits and what kind of securities over immovable property are usually 
undertaken by consumers? 
The mortgage is the main security right consumers undertake in order to secure loans 
to finance the acquisition of real estate. As a matter of fact, 90 per cent of households’ 
                                                          
1
 See EUROSTAT. Distribution of population by tenure status, type of household and income group 
(source: SILC). Last update: 06-06-2016. 
2
 See T. Jurado Guerrero, ‘El creciente dinamismo familiar frente a la inflexibilidad del modelo de 
vivienda español’, (2006) 193 Cuadernos de Información Económica 117-126. Available at http://e-
spacio.uned.es/fez/eserv.php?pid=bibliuned:23037&dsID=Dinamismo_familiar_y_vivienda_Jurado.pdf.  
3
 Royal Decree (RD) 233/2013, 5 April, which governs the State Plan for Promotion of Rented Housing, 
Building Rehabilitation and Urban Renewal and Regeneration and Renewal (BOE –Spanish Official 
Gazette-, n. 86, 10 April 2013), available at: https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2013-3780).   
4
 BOE n. 134, 5 June 2013; available at: https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1994-26003.  
5
 Similar problems may be found in other Southern European countries, see S. Nasarre-Aznar, K. Xerri, 
M. O. Garcia and H. Simón-Moreno, Can tenancy be a real alternative to homeownership as a way of 
housing access? A legal comparison between Portugal-Spain-Malta and other European countries. 
Forthcoming. 
6
 Fotocasa, Los españoles y su relación con la vivienda en 2015 (2016). 
7
 See S. Nasarre-Aznar, ‘La vivienda en propiedad como causa y víctima de la crisis hipotecaria, (2014) 16 
Teoría & Derecho. Revista de Pensamiento Jurídico 11 ff. 
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debt until 2008 stemmed from investments in real estate, mainly through mortgage 
loans.8 According to the Spanish Mortgage Association,9 primary residences guarantee 
90% of housing loans, the loan-to-value (LTV) of which stands between 0-50% in 
almost 40% of cases. Furthermore, the use of floating interest rates –the vast majority 
of mortgage loans were benchmarked against the Euribor- were widespread during the 
Spanish housing boom -2000 to 2007- (less than 10% of mortgage loans were 
benchmarked against fixed interest rates). Low interest rates (Euribor below 2% since 
April 2009), coupled with the widespread presence of interest rate floor clauses in 
mortgage deeds, have led, first, to an increase in fixed interest rates in recent years, 
which accounted for 30% of the total in November 201610, and second, to a increase in 
the number of legal proceedings aiming at rendering such clauses void (see below). 
Do consumers usually/frequently mortgage or otherwise link their residential 
immovable property to credits the purpose of which is not to acquire or renovate such 
property? 
The following Figure shows the purpose of mortgage loans granted between February 
2007 and February 2016. According to this data, the acquisition of primary and 
secondary residences is the main purpose when consumers acquire real estate through 
mortgage loans. Debt refinancing and housing construction (third and fourth position, 
respectively) and other purposes play a minor role. 
 
Figure 1. Purpose of the mortgage loans granted between February 2007 
and February 2016. Source: General Council of Notaries11. 
                                                          
8
 Defensor del pueblo, Crisis Económica y Deudores Hipotecarios (30 July 2015) 7. 
9
 Spanish Mortgage Association (AHE), Analysing the Spanish mortgage pool (March 2016) 5. Available 
at: www.ahe.es. The figures analysed comprise data from 12 credit institutions whose outstanding 
mortgage portfolio accounts for 94% of the total national outstanding mortgage value, excluding 
outstanding residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBs).  
10
 Source: Spanish National Statistics Office (INE, www.ine.es).  
11
 http://www.notariado.org/.  
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Are there many foreign consumers buying/investing in residential immovable 
property? 
The acquisition of real estate by foreigners12 accounted for 12-13% on average of all 
property purchases in 2014-2015. The British (21.34%), the French (8.72%) and the 
Germans (7.33%) were the main nationalities involved in 2015. If we look back to 2006 
(where acquisitions by foreigners amounted to 5.85%), 2008 (where they amounted to 
5.85%) and 2012 (8.1%) there seems to be a constant growth in purchases by 
foreigners. Law 14/2013, 27 September,13 encouraged this, by granting residence visas 
to buyers of real estate the cost of which is at least €500,000. However convenient this 
measure may sound so as to promote the internationalization of the Spanish economy, 
the truth is, however, that it has not had a significant impact on the property market 
as the percentage of acquisitions by foreigners under the provisions of this law was 
very similar in 2015 (5.18%) to what it had been in previous years (5.20% in 2014; 
4.72% in 2013 and 5.21% in 2012).14  
Has the financial and economic crisis led to consumers defaulting on credits secured by 
mortgages (or similar securities) over residential immovable property? If so, has this 
led to a relevant increase in foreclosures and evictions? It would be good if you were 
able provide official figures in this respect. 
There were several factors that fuelled the Spanish housing boom (2000-2007)15: 
accommodative monetary conditions (i.e. low interests rates); improvements in 
domestic economies (thanks to low unemployment rates for Spain, which were below 
12% between 2000 and 2007); an increase in the number of households (due to 
immigration and to baby boomers of the 1960s; in fact the Spanish population grew by 
11% between 1997 and 2006, the number of people employed by 42% and the number 
of homes by 23%);16 tax incentives and foreign investment. During that period, the 
residential construction sector doubled its contribution to the Spanish GPD (from 4.7% 
in 1997 to 9.3% in 2007), and the average price for a square metre increased by 178% 
on average between 1995 and 2007 (The Economist warned in 2005 that Spanish 
                                                          
12
 Colegio de Registradores de la Propiedad, Estadística Registral Inmobiliaria (Anuario 2015), Colegio de 
Registradores de la Propiedad, Bienes Muebles y Mercantiles de España, 66. 
13
 BOE n. 233, 28 September 2013; available at: https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-
2013-10074.  
14
 Colegio de Registradores de la Propiedad, Estadística Registral Inmobiliaria (Anuario 2015), 68. 
15
 E. M. Pareja-Eastaway, ‘El mercado de vivienda en España: La necesidad de nuevas propuestas’, in S. 
Nasarre Aznar (ed.), El acceso a la vivienda en un contexto de crisis (Madrid: Edisofer, 2011) 32 ff.; and 
G. Bernardos Domínguez, ‘Creación y destrucción de la burbuja inmobiliaria en España’, (2009) 850ICE, 
La primera crisis global: procesos, consecuencias 23 ff. 
16
 J. L. Campos Echeverría, La burbuja inmobiliaria española (Madrid-Barcelona: Marcial Pons, 2008).  
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properties were overvalued by 50%17). 
The favourable economic backdrop led to subprime and/or irresponsible lending on 
the part of banks and savings banks so as to help households to enter into the 
mortgage market (see below). Such behaviour was strongly encouraged not only by 
the Spanish governments18 but also by all actors involved (Bank of Spain,19 banks,20 
savings banks and property developers21), which actively denied the existence of a 
housing bubble. Housing was treated then as a capital asset and not as a social right or 
consumer asset, as the UN Special Rapporteur on adequate housing pointed out in 
2008.22 This laid the foundation for consumer’s over-indebtedness, with families 
spending 50% of their income on mortgage repayments in some cities, such as 
Madrid.23 The European Commission also pointed out that the combination of high 
housing prices and consumers’ over-indebtedness could be “explosive”.24 
The Spanish economy was not immune to the international economic crisis.25 A 
number of negative consequences followed when the housing bubble burst in Spain: a 
sharp reduction in the number of mortgage loans (only 32% of housing acquisitions 
were financed through a mortgage loan in January 2013; in contrast, more than 60% of 
dwellings purchased were financed in that way in 2006), thus making access to housing 
more difficult; a sharp increase in the number of vacant dwellings (almost 3.5 million in 
2010, accounting for as much as 13,5% of the total housing stock26); an increase in the 
number of mortgage loans in negative equity (there were more than 500,000 in 
                                                          
17
 The Economist 16-6-05, The global housing boom. In come the waves  
(http://www.economist.com/node/4079027/print?story_id=4079027).  
18
 Francisco Álvarez Cascos (Popular Party): “No existe la burbuja inmobiliaria que algunos dicen. Los 
pisos están caros porque los españoles pueden pagarlos” (20-11-2003); and Beatriz Corredor (PSOE: “El 
2008 es un año excelente para comprar vivienda” (16-03-2008). 
19
 Jaime Caruana (Governor of the Bank of Spain): “No se puede hablar de burbuja inmobiliaria, y ni 
mucho menos de riesgo de pinchazo” (01-07-2004). 
20
 Emilio Botín (Bank of Santander): “No existe burbuja inmobiliaria en España” (23-10-2003). 
21
 Fernando Martín (Martinsa-Fadesa): “La vivienda en el 2009 va a subir vertiginosamente. Tenemos 
salud, y salud boyante” (22-03-2007). 
22
 Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of 
living, Mr. Miloon Kotha, Mission to Spain, 27. Available at: http://www.ohchr.org. 
23
 See, about the origins of consumers’ overindebtedness in Spain and the measures taken to counteract 
such situation, P. Gutiérrez de Cabiedes and M. Cantero Gamito, ‘Country Report Spain’, in H.-W. 
Micklitz and Irina Domurath (eds.), Consumer Debt and Social Exclusion in Europe (Abingdon-on-Thames: 
Routledge, 2016) 67 ff. 
24
 El Mundo 27-3-06, Bruselas pide 'cautela' a la hora de conceder hipotecas por la sobrevaloración de la 
vivienda (http://www.elmundo.es/mundodinero/2006/03/27/economia/1143470709.html).  
25
 From an economic perspective, see E. Ortega and J. Peñalosa, Claves de la crisis económica española y 
retos para crecer en la UEM, Documentos Ocasionales (1201) (2012). 
26
 Source: Dirección General de Arquitectura, Vivienda y Suelo; Ministerio de Fomento, Observatorio de 
Vivienda y Suelo. Boletín especial Censo 2011 (2014). Available at:   
http://www.fomento.gob.es/MFOM.CP.Web/handlers/pdfhandler.ashx?idpub=BAW021 (accessed 18 
July 2016). 
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201027) due to consumers’ over-indebtedness (more than 85% of mortgage loans that 
could not be paid in 2014 and that led to the start of enforcement proceedings were 
entered into in 2007 or earlier28); a sizeable drop in housing prices (more than 40% 
since 200729); an increase in the unemployment rate (13,91% in 2009, 20,33% in 2010, 
and it reached 26% in December 2012; in fact, unemployment is the main reason for 
defaulting on mortgage payments in 70.4 % of the cases30); and more than 400,000 
enforcement proceedings started since 200831 (no distinction between primary and 
secondary residences is made), although only 10% have taken place over primary 
residences in the words of the president of the Spanish General Council of the 
Judiciary.32 Recent data show, however, that the number of enforcement proceedings 
on primary residences decreased by 29.8% in March 2016 by comparison to March 
2015,33 and by 13% in 2015 in comparison to 2014.34 
Notwithstanding the negative outcomes of the crisis quoted above, surprisingly 
enough, no action was taken until 2011, four years after the enactment of Law 
41/2007, 18 December,35 which, despite being coined as the “most profound and 
significant reform of the mortgage market” by the Spanish Mortgage Association,36 did 
not lay down any measure aiming to counteract the impending (as widely known) 
international economic crisis. As a matter of fact, this Law encouraged borrowing –in a 
foreseeable credit crunch context-37 by offering new mortgage products, such as the 
                                                          
27
 Source: El Confidencial 10-4-13, Medio millón de viviendas en España valen menos ya que sus 
hipotecas (http://www.elconfidencial.com/vivienda/2013/04/10/medio-millon-de-viviendas-en-espana-
valen-menos-ya-que-sus-hipotecas-118559/).  
28
 Bank of Spain (30 July 2015) Nota informativa sobre la presentación de una nueva estadística de 
procesos de ejecución hipotecaria sobre viviendas, 30 July 2015, 2. Available at:  
http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/GAP/Secciones/SalaPrensa/NotasInformativas/Briefing_notes/es/notabe
300715.pdf.  
29
 Fotocasa, La vivienda en el año 2015. Available at:  
http://images.fotocasa.es/inmesp/noticias/sala_prensa/informes/17695/LA%20VIVIENDA%20EN%20EL
%20A%c3%91O%202015.pdf.  
30
 Observatorio DESC and PAH (2013), Emergencia habitacional en el Estado español. La crisis de las 
ejecuciones hipotecarias y los desalojos desde una perspectiva de derechos humanos 107. 
31
 Source: http://www.poderjudicial.es/.  
32
 Source: Infolibre (23-3-2013), Stop Desahucios Los jueces llevaron a cabo 101.034 desahucios en 2012 
(http://www.infolibre.es/noticias/politica/2013/03/23/101_034_desahucios_2012_1469_1012.html).  
33
 Source: El Mundo 20/06/16  
(http://www.elmundo.es/economia/2016/06/20/5767c217268e3eff678b45e5.html).   
34
 INE, Estadística sobre Ejecuciones Hipotecarias (EH). Cuarto trimestre de 2015 y Año 2015. Datos 
provisionales (March 2016). Available at: http://www.ine.es/daco/daco42/eh/eh0415.pdf.  
35
 BOE n. 294, 8 December 2007; available at: https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2007-
21086.  
36
 Spanish Mortgage Association, Updated Legal Texts of the Main Laws Regulating the Spanish 
Mortgage Market (December 2007). Available at www.ahe.es.   
37
 In September 2007 the coming credit crunch was widely known. Source: El confidencial 7-9-2007, La 
economía española se queda sin gasolina: bancos y cajas cierran el grifo a empresas y familias 
(http://www.elconfidencial.com/mercados/finanzas-personales/2007-09-07/la-economia-espanola-se-
queda-sin-gasolina-bancos-y-cajas-cierran-el-grifo-a-empresas-y-familias_838964/). 
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reverse mortgage –see below- or a new type of a maximum mortgage (art. 153 bis 
Spanish Mortgage Law). Given the inability of private law rules to address the negative 
effects of the crisis on households during such period, some court decisions started to 
act as “Robin Hood”, distorting the legal principles with the aim to alleviate the 
situation of Spanish households.38 Paradigmatic examples of this approach are 
decisions accepting that liability is limited to the value obtained from the property at 
auction, even if the parties had not agreed upon this (the legal reasoning underlying 
these decisions is either an incorrect application of the doctrine of equity39 or the 
application of the abuse of law doctrine40). Also, some decisions granted a fresh start 
to insolvent mortgagors in insolvency proceedings, which Spanish legislation did not 
permit prior to 2015 (see below Part III). The courts in these cases failed to apply the 
principle of universal liability (art. 1911 Spanish Civil Code). The shortcomings of 
private law rules fuelled increasing pressure from social groups, such as the Platform 
of Mortgage Victims,41 which have been actively involved in failed legislative proposals 
aiming at introducing datio in solutum as a general rule in Spain, but have been 
successful in aborting evictions, especially when pursued by a bank or other financial 
institution. 
Finally, the Spanish Government took several measures after 2011 in reaction to the 
housing crisis with the purpose of alleviating the impact thereof on Spanish 
households, which will be outlined below (Part III). 
If applicable, could you highlight the main reasons why you think your legal system 
regarding securities over immovables failed consumers? We will ask you to provide a 
general sketch of measures adopted in your country to contain or alleviate this 
situation below, in Part III. 
In particular, how relevant do you consider issues such as the following to have been?: 
a) Unfair terms (interest rate floor clauses, high default interest rates, 
acceleration clauses, etc.) 
The Spanish mortgage enforcement procedure is one of the fastest in the EU. It was 
designed as an expeditious path toward recovery of the loan by the lender upon 
default, which would attract investment secured with land or property rights over 
land. And so it did. But the side-effect of the procedure being so fast is that the 
grounds for defence have traditionally been very limited, to the extent that any 
                                                          
38
 See about these “Robinhoodian” court decisions S. Nasarre Aznar, “Robinhoodian courts`decisions on 
mortgage law in Spain” (2015) 7 International Journal of Law in the Built Environment 127 ff. 
39
 Art. 3.2 Spanish Civil Code. Ruling of the Provincial Court of Navarra 17 December 2010. AC 2011\1. 
40
 Art. 7.1 Spanish Civil code. 
41
 http://afectadosporlahipoteca.com/.  
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discussion regarding such an important issue as nullity or avoidability of the loan itself 
has to be discussed in a different procedure, which would not (and still today does not) 
stay the mortgage enforcement proceedings. Cases where the loan or the mortgage 
are null or avoidable (for instance, on the grounds of mistake) are rare, but due to the 
crisis and the increase in the number of foreclosures, judges, practitioners and social 
movements soon realised that the creditors’ titles were often infested with unfair 
terms42 and that the procedure laid down by arts. 681 ff. of the Law on Civil Procedure 
(LEC) 43 did not allow the court or the debtor to raise the issue. 
A request for a preliminary ruling was submitted to the ECJ, which led to its decision 
dated 14 March 2013 (the Aziz case)44, whereby it was held that Spanish mortgage 
rules did not comply with the principle of effectiveness, in so far as they made it 
impossible or excessively difficult, in mortgage enforcement proceedings initiated by 
sellers or suppliers against consumer defendants, to apply the protection that the 1993 
Directive on unfair terms grants them. Following this decision, the Spanish mortgage 
enforcement procedure was reformed by Law 1/2013, 14 May,45 which also introduced 
new provisions on default interest rates and acceleration clauses, among other 
amendments. 
With regard to strictly procedural norms, Law 1/2013 introduced a new defence both 
in general enforcement procedures (art. 557.1.7 LEC) and in the mortgage 
enforcement procedure (art. 695 LEC) whereby the consumer may oppose 
enforcement on the grounds of the title containing unfair terms. In the context of 
mortgage enforcement, these unfair terms must determine the possibility to seek 
enforcement or they must determine the amount claimed. This has led to some 
enforcement proceedings to be rendered void.46 Law 1/2013, however, did not do a 
very good job, since it managed to provide that whilst the creditor could appeal the 
decision to stay the proceedings or to not apply an unfair term, the consumer was not 
granted such a possibility if the consumer’s objection was dismissed. Thus, another ECJ 
decision, dated 17 July 2014,47 held that the domestic rule infringed the principle of 
                                                          
42
 A number of which had been declared unfair by the courts in general, and more specifically by the 
Supreme Court decision 16 December 2009 (ECLI:ES:TS:2009:8466). Recently, see also Supreme Court 
decision 9 May 2013 (on interest rate floor, which will be discussed below); Supreme Court decision 23 
December 2015 (ECLI:ES:TS:2015:5618) and Supreme Court decision 18 February 2016 
(ECLI:ES:TS:2016:626). 
43
 Law 1/2000, 7 January (BOE n. 7, 8 January 2000; available at:  
https://www...es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2000-323). 
44
 Case C-415/11. 
45
 BOE n. 116, 15 May 2013; available at: https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2013-5073. 
46
 Commercial Court n. 3 Barcelona, decision 5 May 2014 (JUR 2014\139100) and Commercial Court n. 1 
Palma de Mallorca, 3 January 2014 (AC 2014\310), later confirmed by the Provincial Court of the 
Balearic Islands decision of 12 May 2014 (JUR 2014\169240). 
47
 Case C-169/14. Sánchez Morcillo and Abril García v Banco Bilbao. 
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equality of arms and, as a result, Law 9/2015, 25 May (additional provision 3) amended 
LEC once again. 
With regard to the default interest rate, Law 1/2013 limited it to three times the 
applicable legal interest rate for mortgages over primary residences and only if the 
purpose of the credit was to finance the acquisition of said primary home. The new 
provision also states that the default interest rate accrues over the principal, not over 
capitalised interests. Generally speaking, this limitation applies to mortgages created 
after the entry into force of Law 1/2013 as well as to default interest accrued or owed 
since then. It is frequent to see default interest rates between 19 and 24%. This, in 
theory, could cost the consumer a lot of money and be disproportionate in comparison 
with the damage caused to the creditor. However, it should also be borne in mind that 
in a landmark case such as the Aziz case that led to the ECJ decision 14 March 2013, 
the default interest rate was extraordinarily high, but the actual default interest 
claimed by the bank was only slightly over €70. 
The courts have taken different approaches once the term providing the default 
interest rate has been deemed unfair and, thus, void.48 In our opinion, and after the 
entry into force of the Law 3/2014, 27 March, which implemented the Directive on 
Consumer Rights (2011/83/EC), the lender should not be entitled to claim any 
compensation at all if the default interest term is rendered void (according to the new 
wording of art. 83 Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007). The ECJ Decisions 21 January 2015 
and 11 June 201549 have taken the same approach, but the Spanish Supreme Court still 
finds ways to grant the creditor compensation.50 
With regard to acceleration clauses, Law 1/2013 amended the mortgage enforcement 
procedure so that the total amount owed may only be claimed insofar as the mortgage 
loan provided for full maturity in the event of the debtor failing to pay three monthly 
instalments or an equivalent amount (art. 693 LEC). However, no explanation is given 
as to why the threshold is set at precisely three months and why this is regardless of 
the duration of the mortgage. It is worth noting that the Spanish Supreme Court stated 
in 200951 that the default of only one mortgage instalment was enough to accelerate 
the mortgage loan and claim the whole outstanding debt. In practice, however, except 
for a period immediately after the crisis had set on, banks started enforcement 
                                                          
48
 For some, the creditor would not be entitled to any compensation whatsoever; others have reduced 
the default interest rate to the limit foreseen in Law 1/2013 or have applied the default rule as if the 
parties had not agreed upon a default interest rate at all (in this case, the legal interest is applied, as per 
article 1108 Spanish Civil Code). See in more detail A. I. Berrocal Lanzarot, ‘Cuestiones controvertidas en 
torno a las cláusulas abusivas insertas en los préstamos o créditos hipotecarios (y II)’ (2016) 753 Revista 
Crítica de Derecho Inmobiliario 500 ff. 
49
 Case C-602/13. 
50
 Supreme Court decisions 22 April 2015 (ECLI:ES:TS:2015:1723) and 3 July 2016 (ECLI:ES:TS:2016:2401).  
51
 Supreme Court decision 16 December 2009. 
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procedures after the non-performance of three or more mortgage instalments, as 
several court decisions show. The rule laid down in Act 1/2013 applies whether the 
property is the main debtor’s residence or not, and regardless of whether the 
borrower is a consumer or not. Spanish courts have adopted different approaches on 
this issue52. Once more, the ECJ has had the opportunity to state that, where an 
acceleration clause in a contract with consumers is deemed unfair, all consequences of 
such a finding should unfold (Order 11 June 2015, C-602/13), but the Spanish Supreme 
Court, in our view, does not follow its doctrine; instead, it justifies claims based on the 
full maturity of the loan and their enforcement by means of the specific mortgage 
procedure by highlighting the “benefits” that this procedure entails for the consumer53 
(which, in our view, are non-existent, since the procedure, as already stated, was 
designed to lure investors into granting very secure loans). In any event, if the 
acceleration clause is unfair, the question is whether the creditor may seek 
enforcement for the full amount in any kind of procedure (which we believe should 
not be possible), and not merely whether the specific mortgage enforcement 
procedure is barred. 
Finally, terms including interest rate floors are a matter of discussion in Spain as 
borrowers complain that they are paying a fixed minimum interest rate (e.g. a 3%), 
whilst the variable interest rate index (i.e. Euribor) is significantly lower (it has very 
rarely been over 2% since March 2009) and the “interest cap” is so high (e.g. a 12%) 
that they are unlikely to benefit from it. The Bank of Spain54 stated that 30% of the 
mortgage portfolio at the end of 2009 contained such terms and that the interest rate 
floor was around 3% on average, whilst the interest cap was around 13% on average. 
According to the Spanish Supreme Court decision 9 May 2013, later confirmed by 
another decision dated 24 March 201555, interest rate floors are lawful but they may 
be deemed to be unfair due to lack of disclosure and information transparency that 
may result in an unexpected change in the price of the loan. This decision also stated 
                                                          
52
 After the entry into force of Law 1/2013, Spanish courts have deemed contractual terms establishing 
the possibility of accelerating the mortgage loan in case of defaulting one monthly payment unfair 
(Provincial Court Vizcaya 30-6-15, JUR 2015\190495). The Provincial Court of Barcelona 30-7-15 (AC 
2015\1538) considered this contractual term unfair even in cases where enforcement took place before 
the entry into force of Law 1/2013, on the basis of the general consumer protection rules on unfair 
contractual terms. The Provincial Court of Barcelona 31-7-2015 (JUR 2015\257933) also considered such 
a term unfair on the basis of the general rules contained in the Spanish Civil Code, according to which 
non-performance must be substantial in order to declare the early termination of the mortgage loan 
(article 1124 Spanish Civil Code). 
53
 Supreme Court decisions 23 December 2015 (ECLI:ES:TS:2015:5618) and 18 February 2016 
(ECLI:ES:TS:2016:626). 
54
 Bank of Spain, Informe del Banco de España sobre determinadas cláusulas presentes en los préstamos 
hipotecarios, which was presented at the request of the Spanish Senate, 18. Available at: 
www.senado.es/legis9/publicaciones/pdf/senado/bocg/I0457.PDF.  
55
 ECLI: ES: TS: 2015: 1279. 
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that consumers are not entitled to claim repayment of the amounts wrongly paid 
during the whole contractual term. Indeed, the interest paid in excess shall be 
refunded to the borrower as from the date of publication of the decision of 9 May 
2013. The Supreme Court based its holding upon the principle of legal certainty and 
the risk of serious difficulties with economic significance for public order should 
consumers be entitled to claim the entire amount that was unduly paid (a full 
retroactivity could lead banks to pay more than 12,000 million euros56).  
Although some courts followed this doctrine, others have continued to rule in favour 
of borrowers entitling them to claim the entire amount they had unduly paid since the 
interest rate floor begun to have an effect on their mortgage loan, regardless of when 
that was. In our opinion, this is the best option, since economic considerations should 
not overrule private law norms as essential as those that provide that when a term (or 
a contract) is deemed null, it should be treated as not having produced any effect 
whatsoever and the statu quo ante should be re-established. This general rule was 
enshrined by the 1889 Spanish Civil Code, thus embracing an ancestral principle.57 
Moreover, nullity, with all its consequences, is an effective deterrent in the area of 
unfair terms. 
However, the opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, delivered on 13 July 2016,58 
stated that art. 6.1 of Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts does not preclude a supreme court decision which finds that ‘floor’ clauses 
are unfair, orders the cessation of their use and their removal from existing contracts 
and declares them invalid, while restricting, on the basis of exceptional circumstances, 
the effects of that invalidity to the date of its first judgment. The opinion of the 
Advocate General is in line with the arguments used by the Spanish Supreme Court 
decisions. A final ruling by the ECJ is expected at the end of 2016. In the meantime, the 
Spanish Supreme Court is staying appeals on this matter.59 
 
                                                          
56
 Source: El Mundo 26-4-2016, La banca sabrá en julio si debe devolver hasta 7.600 millones más por las 
'cláusulas suelo' (http://www.elmundo.es/economia/2016/04/26/571f87ba46163fca708b4640.html).  
57
 We support thus the view of F. Redondo Trigo, ‘Acerca de la limitación de la retroactividad de la 
'cláusula suelo' en la sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de 25 de marzo de 2015 en base al régimen 
general restitutorio de la nulidad y al Orden Público’ (2015) 750 Revista Crítica de Derecho Inmobiliario, 
who argues that “El Orden Público Económico ni es Fuente del Derecho ya que ni siquiera tiene el 
fundamento en los Principios Generales del Derecho, ni está basado en la realidad social por lo que no 
puede servir como criterio interpretativo de una norma jurídica y su recurso en el caso analizado se nos 
revela más que nada como un auténtico y desmesurado arbitrio judicial y en cuya decisión no se sigue el 
sistema de fuentes establecido (art. 1.7 del Código Civil)” 2395. 
58
 Due to requests for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Mercantil n. 1 de Granada 
(Commercial Court n.1, Granada, Spain) (Case C-154/15) and from the Audiencia Provincial de Alicante 
(Provincial Court, Alicante, Spain) (Cases C-307/15 and C-308/15)). 
59
 Supreme Court Order 12 April 2016 (ECLI:ES:TS:2016:2927A). 
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b) Interest Rate Swaps and other interest rate limitation products 
Interest rate swaps were marketed by credit entities in a clearly bullish Euribor period 
(the Euribor reached its peak -5.38%- in October 2008) and have been deemed to be a 
bad banking practice as the subsequent decrease of the interest rate has favoured 
banks exclusively.60 These products fall under the scope of Royal Legislative Law 
4/2015, 23 October, on the securities market (which repealed the previous Law 
24/1988)61; therefore, investment firms must carry out the suitability and convenience 
tests.62 Court decisions show how these tests –aimed at protecting retail investors- 
were not carried out properly, and credit institutions did not deliver the mandatory 
pre-contractual information concerning these products. This may result in the contract 
being rendered void (Supreme Court decision 17 November 201563) on the grounds of 
lack of provision of information relating to the product and the doctrine of mistake 
(art. 1266 Spanish Civil Code).  
c) Foreign currency loans, bridging loans, buy-to-let schemes, reverse 
mortgages 
It was said that there were around 65,000 multicurrency mortgages in Spain in 2012. 64 
This data has been later confirmed by the Spanish Asociación de Usuarios Financieros, 
which outlined in its last report (30 June 2016)65 that there are more than 70,000 
multicurrency mortgages in Spain, 46% of which were denominated in yens and 52% in 
Swiss francs. This Report also highlighted the fact that borrowers have lost on average 
200,000 euros per mortgage, and that banks accumulate a total of €14,000M in loans 
in foreign currencies. Taking into consideration the total number of mortgages created 
between 2005 and 2011 for housing purposes (more than 5 million), multicurrency 
mortgages do not seem to be significant in the Spanish mortgage market. Borrowers 
have however complained about the complexity of this mortgage product, and it is 
worth mentioning that multicurrency mortgages have been deemed to be a financial 
                                                          
60
 S. Nasarre Aznar, ‘Malas prácticas’, 2686 ff. 
61
 BOE n. 255, 24 October 15; available at: https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2015-
11435.  
62
 They must obtain the necessary information regarding the client’s or potential client’s knowledge and 
experience in the investment field relevant to the specific type of product or service, his financial 
situation and his investment objectives (suitability test, art. 213). On the other hand, they must ask the 
client or potential client to provide information regarding his knowledge and experience in the 
investment field relevant to the specific type of product or service offered or requested (convenience 
test, art. 214). 
63
 ECLI:ES:APTE:2015:138. 
64
 Source: El Confidencial 9-12-2012, La pesadilla de las hipotecas en yenes: cuotas que se duplican y 
deudas que engordan un 40% (http://www.elconfidencial.com/vivienda/2012-12-09/la-pesadilla-de-las-
hipotecas-en-yenes-cuotas-que-se-duplican-y-deudas-que-engordan-un-40_200237/).  
65
Available at:  
https://asufin.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/160630-2-INFORME-Hipoteca-Multidivisa.pdf  
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derivative by the Supreme Court decision 30 June 2015,66 thus leading to the 
application of the investor protection rules laid down in above-mentioned legislation 
on the securities market. 
Reverse mortgages were regulated for the first time in Spain by Law 41/2007 
(Additional provision 1), although banks and savings banks had marketed such 
products before. Óptima Mayores67, one of the leading companies in providing advice 
to the elderly in Spain, found in a survey carried out in 2005 that a total of 21 
institutions marketed these products in 2008 and approximately 2,500 contracts were 
concluded. The same report conducted in 201068 pointed to a growth in the marketing 
of reverse mortgages, but the number of institutions marketing them had descended 
to 19. A study carried out in 201169 among 92 institutions showed the following 
results: only 19 were actively marketing such product and only 7 sent information 
about the product (22 did not answer). This would be consistent with the fact that only 
a few thousands of reverse mortgages were granted until 2011; there was no official 
data for the same year.70 Recent interviews with the main intermediaries of these 
products revealed that the reverse mortgage market is not currently significant, with 
few transactions concluded per month. It is actually a problem for elderly people, 
perhaps severely hit by the crisis, to not be able to monetise their assets; banks do not 
want to risk being landed with more real estate. Therefore, the economic crisis has had 
a huge impact on the marketing of these products as the economic environment (as 
well as other sociological and cultural factors) plays a key role in their success. 
As for buy-to-let schemes, there were not the rule during the Spanish housing boom as 
investors acquired dwellings with the aim of obtaining high returns from their sale in 
the short term, since housing prices significantly increased from one year to another 
(the year-on-year growth rates reached 17%). Due to the current problems in 
accessing homeownership, Law 4/201371 was passed with the aim to boost the 
tenancy market, by rendering rent contracts more flexible (thus decreasing the 
tenant’s rights). Before this, the main goal pursued by Law 11/2009, 26 October, which 
regulated the Real Estate Investment Listed Companies,72 was the professionalization 
                                                          
66
 ECLI:ES:TS:2015:3002. 
67
 Óptima Mayores, ‘Informe Anual de la Hipoteca Inversa’ (2008, December) Boletín Informativo 
Semanal de Seguros 58 ff. 
68
 Óptima Mayores, ‘Informe Anual de la Hipoteca Inversa 2010’, 3. 
69
 E. Del Pozo García; Z. Díaz Martínez; L. Fernández Sevilla, ‘La hipoteca inversa en España: un estudio 
comparativo con otros países de la Unión Europea y EEUU’ (2011) 15 Revista Universitaria Europea 99 ff. 
70
 According to El Confidencial 24-11-11, El piso a cambio de una pensión: otro ‘cadáver’ del crash 
inmobiliario, neither the Spanish Bank Association (AEB) nor the Confederation of Saving Banks (CECA) 
had data on this matter (http://www.elconfidencial.com/vivienda/2011-11-24/el-piso-a-cambio-de-una-
pension-otro-cadaver-del-crash-inmobiliario_212409/). 
71
 BOE n. 134, 5 June 2013; available at: https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2013-5941.  
72
 BOE n. 259, 27 October 2009; available at: https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2009-
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of the private rental sector (more than 21 companies have been established since 
200973). The decrease in housing prices, coupled with the growing importance of 
tenancy, make buy-to-let schemes more appealing now than during the housing boom. 
As a matter of fact, the investment in properties with a commercial view (resale or 
rent) accounted for 20% on average in July 2016,74 probably aided by the fact that the 
gross return on rental is over 4% on average.75 
Bridging loans were used during the housing boom for speculative purposes, and also 
some consumers who simply aimed to improve their quality of life were caught up in 
these schemes, promoted by both property developers and the banking sector, at the 
time when the property bubble burst. There are instances where both the purchase of 
the second property and the mortgage loan could be deemed null and void, on the 
grounds of fraud and/or mistake. 
d) Interest rates referenced to indexes resulting from borrowing rates among 
a small group of creditors 
See below Part II, 8. 
e) The existence of non-regulated and/or non-supervised lenders 
Law 26/1988, 29 July, on the discipline and intervention of credit institutions, 
established a special administrative supervision regime for financial institutions. This 
Law has been amended by Law 10/2014, June 26.76 The problem was, however, that 
credit intermediaries were only subject to consumer law rules and the provision of 
mortgage loans is not an activity reserved for credit institutions. In order to address 
this problem, Law 2/2009, 31 March, on contracting with consumers for mortgaged 
backed credits or loans by companies other than credit institutions or their agents77, 
was passed. These lenders must comply with the same transparency requirements 
required of credit institutions. It is worth noting, however, that this set of rules was 
introduced after the housing bubble burst. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
17000).  
73
 Source: http://www.bolsasymercados.es/mab/esp/SOCIMI/Listado.aspx. 
74
 According to Servihabitat, a well-known Spanish estate agent linked to one of the three big banks. 
Source: La Vanguardia 25/7/16, Una de cada cinco viviendas en España se compra como inversión 
(http://www.lavanguardia.com/economia/20160725/403448629210/extranjeros-grandes-inversores-
compran-vivienda-espana-rentabilidad-alquiler.html).  
75
 Source: Bank of Spain, Indicadores Del Mercado De La Vivienda. Available at:  
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/si_1_5.pdf  
76
 BOE n. 156, 27 June 2014; available at: https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2014-6726.  
77
 BOE n. 79, 1 April 2009; available at: https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2009-5391.  
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Scholars78 argue that in order to increase the effectiveness of this Law it should be 
required that notaries mention whether the transaction is subject to Law 2/2009 or 
not, and, where applicable, that they check that the private lender is registered at the 
public company register and that it complies with the reporting obligations set out by 
Law 2/2009. The Law should also require notaries to verify that the borrower receives 
the amount loaned in full. In this respect, notaries should refrain from formalising 
public mortgage deeds if the borrower states that a greater amount than what is 
delivered before the notary has been received. 
f) Deposits or other advanced payments made when consumers acquire 
immovable property that may render transparency provisions ineffective 
As pointed out elsewhere,79 the starting point of the sale process in Spain is a private 
contract; delivery does not take place at this first stage, so property is not transferred 
yet (this would require a public deed). The buyer assumes as a general rule the duty to 
provide the seller with a deposit (earnest money), the amount of which is not limited 
by law. These preliminary (not notarised) contracts were the rule during the housing 
bubble in Spain (2000-2007) and are still quite common, including when professional 
developers sell the properties before completing the building (off-plan). In this case, 
Royal Decree (RD) 515/1989, 21 April,80 imposes on the developer the duty to provide 
consumers with some pre-contractual information relating to the real estate 
concerned (name of the seller, location of the building and materials used, etc.).  
However, problems arise when the developer falls into bankruptcy before finishing the 
construction81. The buyer must start a long and complex procedure to recover the 
earnest money already paid. In this case, the Spanish Insolvency Law 22/2003, 9 July82, 
does not consider purchasers to be privileged creditors, although they may seek the 
termination of the contract (arts. 61 and 62). In order to address these problems, Law 
57/1968, 27 July, was enacted. It provided for measures destined to guarantee the 
return of the deposits, but they were not properly applied.83
 
Indeed, insurance 
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 F. Zunzunegui, who has delivered several speeches on this topic, such the one delivered in 2009 at the 
Primer Congreso Nacional de Asesores e Intermediarios de Crédito (Madrid, 19 May 2009). 
79
 P. Sparkes, Lead author of the report on Cross-Border Acquisitions of Residential Property: Problems 
that Arise for Citizens (European Parliament, January 2016) 110. 
80
 BOE n. 117, 17 May 1989; available at:  
https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-1989-11181.  
81
 Purchasing off plan is one of the problems in cross-border acquisitions of immovable property pointed 
out by Diana Wallis, ´European Property Wrongs – what can the EU do?`, in D. Wallis & S. Allanson 
(eds.), European Property Rights & Wrongs, 14 (available at: http://www.elra.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/EUROPEAN-PROPERTY-RIGHTS-2.pdf). 
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 BOE n. 164, 10 July 2003; available at: https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2003-13813.  
83
 Memoria del Servicio de Reclamaciones (Madrid: Bank of Spain, 2008) 66 ff; J. Romero Domínguez, La 
Recuperación de Cantidades Anticipadas por el Adquirente de Vivienda en Construcción (Valencia: Tirant 
lo Blanch, 2011). 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companies estimated that only 30% of private home developments complied with the 
requirements set by Law 57/1968; this proportion rose to (only) 70% in state 
subsidised housing.84 This Law has been repealed by Law 20/2015, 14 July85, which has 
introduced new protective measures regarding down payments.  
Lastly, it is worth noting that, due to the credit crunch, some Spanish households have 
faced difficulties in obtaining the mortgage loan in order to finance the acquisition of 
the property once the preliminary contract had already been concluded (e.g. in 2006) 
and the construction had been finished (e.g. in 2008, after the burst of the housing 
bubble). It is a matter of discussion whether the rebus sic stantibus doctrine (“things 
standing thus”) could apply and thus allow rescission of the preliminary contract in 
such circumstances; otherwise the buyer will be liable with all his present and future 
assets before the seller for the full amount of the purchase price (art. 1911 Spanish 
Civil Code). The Spanish Supreme Court has been generally reluctant to apply the 
above-mentioned doctrine, but it has left the door open to its application under 
specific circumstances (Supreme Court decisions 17 January 201386, 26 April 201387, 30 
June 201488 and 30 April 201589).  
g) The role of notaries or other professionals in conveyance and mortgaging 
Notaries fulfil a role that sometimes goes beyond that of just formalising the 
conveyance deed (which includes the sale contract and produces the transfer of 
property, as well as allowing registration thereof) and the mortgage deed. In Spain 
(Decree 2 June 194490, art. 147) the notary has the duty to inform the parties, check 
the title to the property and the encumbrances that may exist over it, and consult the 
Land Registry before the deed is executed. 
When the deed is presented for registration, the land registrar assesses, under his or 
her responsibility, the formal requirements of the document, the capacity of the 
parties and the intrinsic validity of the documented transaction, as well as the 
obstacles to registration that may arise from the Land Register itself (Spanish 
Mortgage (Land Register) Law, art. 18). 
Therefore, Spanish notaries and land registrars play a key role as gatekeepers in 
assessing the legality of real estate transactions in Spain. However, the Spanish 
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 Á Carrasco Perera, E Cordero Lobato & C González Carrasco, Régimen Jurídico de la Edificación 
(Pamplona: Aranzadi, 2007) 555. 
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 BOE n. 168, 15 July 15; available at: https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2015-7897.  
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 ECLI:ES:TS:2013:1013. 
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 ECLI:ES:TS:2013:2247. 
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 ECLI:ES:TS:2014:2823. 
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 ECLI:ES:TS:2015:1923. 
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Héctor Simón Moreno & Miriam Anderson  Working paper 8/2017 
18 
 
ombudsman91 pointed out that there were a number of complaints from clients 
expressing their concerns about the performance of some notaries, because -in their 
view- they felt that they did not provide adequate information when proceeding with 
the formalization of mortgage loans, thus limiting their intervention to quickly reading 
the corresponding deed without giving any advice to citizens, although in most cases 
the borrowers did not accurately understand the contractual terms (such as the ones 
related to floor clauses and swaps) due to the complexity thereof. 
With regards to the duties of notaries, the Spanish Order EHA/2899/2011, 28 October, 
on transparency and protection of clients of banking services,
92
 imposes on notaries 
the duty to check if the borrower has received the binding offer prior to the conclusion 
of the contract (see below Part II, 3), and if such offer coincides with the information 
gathered on the deed. They will also check if the Personalized Information Sheet 
(FIPER) has been delivered to the borrower prior to the conclusion of the contract. In 
relation to unfair terms, notaries are required to verify that mortgage deeds they 
formalise do not contain general conditions declared invalid by a final judicial decision 
that have been registered in the Register of General Conditions (art. 147 Decree 2 June 
1944). It should be noted that this Register is far from efficient. 
Notaries, however, cannot declare contractual terms unfair themselves, even though 
their main role is to control the legality of the transaction. It is worth noting that arts. 
30.(3) and (4) of Order EHA/2899/2011 stated that notaries shall refuse to authorise a 
loan when it does not comply with the provisions of that order and whatever other 
legislation is in force, but this provision was declared null and void by the National High 
Court decision 5 March 2013, later confirmed by the Supreme Court decision 7 March 
2016,93 which has been criticised by scholars.94 The same applies with regards to the 
power of Land Registrars over unfair contractual terms (General Directorate of 
Registrars and Notaries, decision 1 October 201095). 
The underlying problem is that not all decisions declaring contractual terms unfair 
have access in due time to the Register of General Conditions, thus hindering the 
effective control of unfair contractual terms by these gatekeepers. As an example, the 
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 Defensor del pueblo, Crisis económica y deudores hipotecarios: actuaciones y propuestas del Defensor 
del Pueblo (January 2012) 71 ff (available at:  
https://www.defensordelpueblo.es/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2012-01-Crisis-econ%C3%B3mica-y-
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 BOE n. 261, 29 October 2011; available at:  
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93
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consideración de la intervención notarial’, in M.A. Alcalá Díaz, Hacia un nuevo modelo de mercado 
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Supreme Court decision 16 December 2009 declared a number of clauses void, six 
years after the decision of the court of first instance (!). This means that such terms 
were in force during a long period of time in thousands of mortgage deeds without 
notaries and land registrars –formally considered to control the legality of real estate 
transactions - having the chance to deem such terms void. 
On the other hand, real estate agents also play a relevant role in the property market 
by providing advice to potential buyers.96 This role, however, has been called into 
question in Spain after the housing bubble burst due to the lack of sufficient skills and 
training. Indeed, only the Autonomous Communities of Catalonia (Decree 12/2010, 2 
February) and the Basque Country (Law 3/2015, 18 June, additional provision 1, not in 
force since it has been challenged before the Constitutional Court, 18 April 201697) 
establish the conditions that estate agents must meet so as to act in the property 
market after the liberalisation that took place in Spain by means of  Royal Decree (RD) 
47/2000, 23 June. Therefore, no rules on specific training, insurance or the duty to 
keep an office open to the public, which promote professionalization in this sector, 
were in force during the Spanish housing boom. 
h) Unfair commercial practices; irresponsible lending 
A number of unfair commercial practices have been identified in the banking sector in 
recent years, as mentioned above. As a matter of fact, the European Parliament 
resolution 8 October 2015 stated that “over the past few years 700,000 Spanish 
citizens are estimated to have been the victims of financial fraud, as they were sold 
risky financial instruments in bad faith by their banks, without being duly informed 
about the extent of the risks and the real implications of not being able to access their 
savings”; and the Bank of Spain’s Claims Report98 pointed out that 20,262 claims were 
presented in 2015, of which 9,354 were related to interest rate floor terms -46,2% of 
the total-, and 19,9% were related to other issues regarding active operations, such as 
the lenders’ behaviour concerning the application of Royal Decree-Law (RDL) 6/2012 
and the RDL 1/2015 (which accounted for 488 claims; on these provisions, see below 
Part III). The Report for 2014 showed similar results. The underlying reasons behind 
consumer claims have changed compared to before the crisis, though, as well as the 
amount of claims. As an example, the Report for 2007 showed that the Bank of Spain 
answered 4,687 claims, 25,6% of which were related to credits and loans. The issues at 
stake were the usual ones at that time (commissions due, contractual terms, such as 
those related to interest rates, or the information provided by lenders). 
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Having said that, it is worth pointing out that a number of legal provisions are in place 
to protect consumers: Law 3/1991, 10 January99, protects consumers against unfair 
commercial practices, such as misleading advertising; Law 34/1988, 11 November100, 
protects consumers against illegal advertising; and the Ministerial Order 
EHA/1718/2010, 11 June101, deals with the regulation and control of the advertising of 
financial services and products. 
Regarding irresponsible lending, a number of mortgage loans were granted with a 
100% loan-to-value during the Spanish housing boom. In order to address such issue, 
the Sustainable Economy Law 2/2011, 4 March102, introduced for the first time the 
duty of credit institutions to assess borrower’s creditworthiness (art. 29). Later, art. 18 
of the Spanish Ministerial Order EHA/2899/2011 also included such duty. The major 
issue here is to determine the consequences of the lender granting the loan in spite of 
a negative creditworthiness assessment or when it has not been carried out 
adequately (see below part II). 
On the other hand, the legal framework on securitisation also fostered subprime 
lending. The (apparent) recent economic recovery has increased lenders’ confidence to 
the extent that subprime mortgage lending has increased its presence in the banking 
sector (see below). As a matter of fact, new mortgage loans with a LTV exceeding 80% 
have now reached 15% of the total.103 
i) Provisions on usury and anatocism (compound interest) 
The Spanish usury law dates back to 1908 and is still in force.104 According to this act, 
loan agreements shall be declared void if they set higher interest rates than normal, 
which are manifestly disproportionate according to the specific circumstances of the 
case; also, loan contracts shall be deemed void if the interest rate can be considered 
unfair, because there are reasons to believe that the loan has been accepted by the 
borrower as a result of being in a desperate situation, or due to inexperience or limited 
mental faculties. Generally speaking, court decisions apply this set of rules only to 
ordinary interest; default interest rates are deemed to fall outside the scope of the 
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Usury Law (Supreme Court Decision 4 June 2009105). Several court decisions have 
rendered mortgage loans void on these grounds, but the interpretation of the act 
varies from one decision to another.106 
With regard to anatocism, by which interest outstanding shall accrue the legal interest 
from the time that it is judicially claimed (arts. 1109 Spanish Civil Code and 317 of the 
Spanish Commercial Code), Law 1/2013 established that, if the mortgage loan is over a 
primary residence and its purpose was to acquire it, default interest rates may only 
accrue on the outstanding principal. The provisions of Law 1/2013 on anatocism apply 
to mortgage loans created before its entry into force that have not been enforced yet. 
Courts may, however, render this contractual term void on other grounds, such as 
consumer protection rules (Provincial Court decision of Alicante 10 June 2014107 and 
see above, Part I.a). 
j) Property appraisal systems 
The property appraisal system108 was introduced in Spain as a compulsory requirement 
so as to issue covered bonds and securitise mortgage loans (since Law 2/1981 and the 
Decree 685/1982). The appraisal sector became more and more professionalised since 
that moment. Appraisals were not carried out, however, for the benefit of lenders and 
borrowers, but to offer guarantees to the prospective holders of the title. RD 775/1997 
and later the Ministerial Order ECO/805/2003, 27 March, introduced rules relating to 
appraisal companies (i.e. minimum capital share, human, technical and professional 
requirements, liability insurance, etc.), thus increasing legal certainty in this aspect of 
the mortgage market. Notwithstanding such set of rules, the independence of 
appraisers was called into question during the Spanish housing boom, as lenders set up 
their own appraisal companies. This situation led to a conflict of interests, since 
lenders demanded “generous” appraisals so that the LTV fell within the margins set for 
issuing covered bonds and for securitisation. More than 90% of the equity appraisals 
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 As an example, the Supreme Court decision 18 June 2012 (ECLI:ES:TS:2012:5966) refers to a case 
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medidas financieras en el contexto de la crisis econòmica (Madrid: Edisofer, 2009) 75 ff; and A. Gómez-
Bezares Revuelta, F. Gómez-Bezares Pascual, A. Jiménez Eguizábal, ‘Regulación de la tasación 
inmobiliaria’ (2015) 6 Revista de Derecho, Empresa y Sociedad (REDS) 155 ff. 
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carried out between 1998 and 2007 were for mortgage financing purposes.109 
Appraisers contributed to some extent to the over-indebtedness of Spanish 
households as they overvalued properties, thus allowing borrowers to finance the 
acquisition of real estate as well as other goods and services, such as cars, holidays, 
etc.110 The close relationship between banks and appraisal companies was highlighted 
by the Supreme Court decision 18 July 2013.111 
This situation was addressed in 2007 and again in 2013 by the Spanish legislature, as 
will be shown below (Part II, 6). 
k) Assignment of secured credits to investment funds 
Mortgage loans may be securitised (Law 5/2015, 27 April, on Promotion of Corporate 
Finance,112 which repealed the previous rules on securitisation contained in Law 
19/1992 – on securitisation of mortgage certificates- and RD 926/1998 – on 
securitisation of any other claim-). The following figure shows the essential data on the 
volume of covered bonds (1) and securitisation (2) in the Spanish mortgage pool.  
 
 Figure 2. Spanish mortgage pool. Source: Spanish Mortgage Association113 
The legal framework on securitisation contributed to some extent to the housing 
boom.114 Although Law 2/1981 required a loan-to-value of up to 80% so as to 
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securitise mortgage loans, Law 44/2002, 22 November,115 allowed credit institutions to 
securitise sub-prime mortgages through mortgage transfer certificates, which did not 
comply with the LTV requirements set out by Law 2/1981.116 
A number of court decisions have recently called into question the legal standing of 
credit institutions so as to initiate enforcement proceedings on the basis of unpaid 
mortgage loans that were securitised.117 
In addition, the Spanish Law 9/2012, 14 November, on restructuring and resolving 
credit institutions,118 created the so-called Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the 
Banking Sector (FROB) in order to safeguard the stability of the financial system while 
minimising the use of public resources. This entity can force a credit institution to 
transfer certain types of assets held on its balance sheet, such as mortgage loans, to an 
asset management company. In this vein, the Law also provides that assets shall be 
transferred to the asset management company with no need for third-party consent to 
be obtained, by means of any legal transaction, and without complying with the 
requirements for structural changes to commercial companies. In this respect, articles 
of association or contractual terms restricting the transferability of holdings may not 
be brought to bear against such transfers, and no liability or compensation claims of 
any kind may be filed for breach of such provisions or terms. 
As a result, this regulation has superseded the application of art. 1535 Spanish CC, 
according to which, in the event of sale of a litigious credit, the debtor shall be entitled 
to extinguish said credit by reimbursing the assignee for the price paid, any costs 
incurred and interest on the price from the date on which it was paid.119 
The narrow scope and application of this article has been brought to light, since some 
vulture funds have acquired mortgage loans and consumer credits, and borrowers may 
not have the chance to pay off the debt because art. 1535 Spanish CC only applies to 
litigious credits. As a matter of fact, it is said120 that international investors have 
                                                                                                                                                                          
higher issuance of ABS” see I. Roibás Millán, ‘Securitization in Spain: Past developments and expected 
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acquired more than 17,000 million euros of consumer and mortgage loans since 2012. 
In Catalonia, Law 24/2015, 29 July (additional provision) granted all debtors of 
assigned credits the possibility to acquire the credit – and therefore extinguish the 
claim- by reimbursing the assignee the price paid, the legal interest and any expenses 
incurred, regardless of the nominal value of the credit. This Catalan act is, in general, 
very poorly drafted (in this particular aspect, for instance, it does not provide for time 
limits of any kind) and it is naïve, since the real problem is finding out what price the 
credit was sold for in the event of transfers in bulk, and no disclosure duties are laid 
down to this effect. Whatever the case, it is irrelevant at the moment, since of course 
this provision has been challenged before the Constitutional Court by the Spanish 
Government and it does not apply at present.121 
Part II. The Impact of Directive 2014/17 
Has your country transposed Directive 2014/17?  
If applicable, do you think that, in general terms, the transposition has been carried 
out adequately?  
As of December 2016, Directive 2014/17/EU (MCD) had not been transposed in Spain 
and therefore it was one of the 20 Member States against which infringement 
proceedings were launched by the Commission.122 Spain is renowned for implementing 
EU Directives late, especially where core matters, such as property rights over land, 
and other relevant sectors, like tourism, may be concerned.123 Moreover, the two last 
general elections (December 2015 and June 2016) resulted in hung parliaments and, 
although the caretaker government continued to function, it did not seem like the 
transposition of of the MCD was a priority. Having said that, it would not have been 
the first time that we were surprised by an expeditious transposition by means of a 
legislative tool in the hands of the government and designed for emergency legislation 
(the “Royal Decree-Law”; RDL); this would probably have meant that the Directive 
would merely be copied into Spanish law.124 If this had been the case, transposition 
would probably have been inadequate and yet another opportunity to reassess the 
credit mortgage legal framework in Spain would have been missed. And this will be the 
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result, as well, if the Draft Bill published on 26 July 2016 (hereinafter, “the Draft 
Bill”)125 crystallises as the mechanism chosen to transpose the MCD. It mainly focuses 
on the regulation of creditors, credit intermediaries and representatives and it 
bypasses all the issues that we consider more relevant and that could have direct 
private law implications (such as the creditworthiness assessment and the 
implementation of art.28 MCD). Most matters are simply delegated to the Ministry of 
Economy and Competitiveness. Therefore, the provisions on relevant topics will still be 
contained in administrative instruments and not in acts of parliament.  
However, both Catalonia126 and Andalusia127 have enacted provisions that are inspired 
by the MCD and amount to partial transpositions thereof. In different instances, the 
Spanish Constitutional Court has held that European legislation does not alter the 
internal distribution of powers between the central government and parliament and 
the autonomous regions in Spain;128 therefore, if a region has the power to legislate on 
consumer protection or on civil matters, it can transpose EU directives concerning 
these areas of law. In our case, the Andalusian Act expressly states that it develops the 
region’s powers regarding consumer protection and that no civil or commercial law 
sanction is attached to its provisions; therefore, only administrative sanctions are in 
place to ensure the enforcement of the rules it lays down. Unlike Andalusia, Catalonia 
does have powers in civil matters, but, again, the Act does not attach civil sanctions to 
the infringements thereof. It should also be noted that the powers of Autonomous 
Communities are, by definition, limited, and areas such as the organisation and 
supervision of the banking system or the basic credit circulation criteria129 or, more 
broadly, the “general planning of the economy”130 or the basic conditions to guarantee 
equality in constitutional rights and duties throughout Spain131 are reserved to the 
Spanish State.132 Thus these two pieces of legislation do not cover the entire content 
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of the Directive, and focus mainly on information duties (although they both refer to 
the creditworthiness assessment).133 
Even if the Directive has not been transposed, we would like to find out what changes 
it entails in your legal system and whether they remedy any of the problems you have 
pointed out to be the most relevant in Part I. 
In particular, it would be good to address the following areas: 
1) If the Directive has been transposed, and with regard to its scope, has your 
country made use of the possibility to not apply the Directive or part thereof as 
per art. 3.3? If so, does this allow for the continuation of bad practices? 
Hopefully Spain will not make use of the exclusions provided for by art. 3.3. Applying 
art. 3.3.(a) would mean that credits undertaken for, let’s say, medical expenses and 
guaranteed with the family home, could be excluded from the protection granted by 
art. 11 and the ESIS. The reform of Directive 2008/48 does not solve the problem. 
Although, as stated above, the majority of mortgage loans in Spain are undertaken to 
finance acquisition or refurbishment, there does not seem to be a valid reason to 
exclude other consumer credits from the supposedly enhanced protection sought by 
the Directive. The same can be said with regard to bridging loans, for which not even 
the precaution laid down by art. 3.5 applies. On the other hand, in Spain the main 
problem seems to be access to housing (or maintaining it) and, from this perspective, 
some of the direct exclusions laid down in art. 3.2 are surprising. For instance, even if 
conditions offered to bank employees are good in comparison to those advertised to 
the general public, the employee still undertakes a huge economic and personal risk 
and may lose the family home as a result. The employee’s skills may justify more 
lenient information obligations (although not always; this will depend on the 
employee’s position in the bank), but it does not explain why the provisions on 
creditworthiness assessment should not apply and, moreover, why the creditor (who 
may have loaned irresponsibly) should then be able to foreclose without showing 
“reasonable forbearance”. From another point of view, although it is obvious that the 
creditworthiness assessment is irrelevant when granting a reverse mortgage, the 
vulnerable situation in which the consumer will usually be when entering into it ought 
to lead to increased protection, especially bearing into account how highly he or she is 
compromising the property in exchange for what will usually be a relatively small 
income or capital. 
                                                          
133
 In spite of its limitations, the Spanish caretaker government has challenged the Catalan 2014 Act, on 
the grounds that it invades reserved powers. The Court acknowledged initiation of the proceedings on 6 
October 2015 (BOE 9 n. 242, October 2015). 
Héctor Simón Moreno & Miriam Anderson  Working paper 8/2017 
27 
 
The Draft Bill basically transcribes art. 3.2 MCD and does not make use of any of the 
exclusions available to the States under art. 3.3. Although Spain could extend the 
relevant provisions to loans described in art. 3.2, we believe it is at least good news 
that no further exclusions are embraced. On the other hand, two aspects ought to be 
highlighted. First, the scope of the Draft Bill does not appear to be restricted to 
consumers, but to apply to any natural person. Second, it states that it applies to 
credits secured with a “home” (vivienda, in Spanish) and it does not define the 
concept. Since it does not require the “home” to be habitual, primary or permanent, 
we understand that the Draft Bill may cover the same types of properties as the 
Directive when it refers to “residential immovable property” (which, surprisingly for an 
EU norm, it does not define either). As shown in the following paragraph, this is a 
recurring problem. 
As is the case with different crisis-induced Spanish enactments,134 the scope of the 
provisions introduced by Catalan Law 20/2014 varies. Those dealing with default 
interest rates and interest rate floor terms apply to any consumer of mortgage credits. 
Other provisions, such as those imposing information obligations upon the notary and 
a compulsory intermediation prior to mortgage enforcement proceedings, apply to 
consumers whose credits “relate” to a “home” (it is not clear whether the concept of 
“home” includes only primary homes, both primary homes and secondary homes or 
also any building apt to be used as a home). Finally, the provisions that are clearly 
inspired by the Directive apply only where the credit was undertaken to finance the 
acquisition or refurbishment of the “home”, which would seem consistent with the 
exception of art. 3.3 (a) MCD, were it not for the fact that the provisions contained in 
this part of the Catalan Law cover other areas as well as arts. 11 and 14 MCD. The 
Andalusian Act only applies to mortgage credits over homes (again, no concept is 
given), “without prejudice” to other legislation, including the Directive. 
2) Prior to the implementation of the Directive, did your system have similar rules 
to those laid down in art. 7 regarding the remuneration of the staff working for 
credit institutions, intermediaries or representatives? In particular, were there 
restrictions to tying remuneration to the number of credits granted? Do you 
think the rules on knowledge and skills required of the staff significantly alter 
the existing norms and/or practice? 
In the light of your system, do you think more stringent provisions should rule 
the use of expressions such as “advice” and “advisory services” (art. 22)? In 
other words, has the fact that consumers trusted the employees of their local 
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bank branch or other credit institution had a significant role in inadequate 
borrowing or over-indebtedness? 
Prior to the MCD, and in the light of CRD III and the reforms it entailed in Spain,135 a 
poll carried out by PriceWaterhouseCoopers136 showed that, consistently with the fact 
that Spanish banking has traditionally focused on commercial banking, rather than on 
investment banking, the remuneration policies have always been rather conservative. 
At the time, in 93% of the instances analysed, variable remuneration amounted to less 
than 50% of the total salary. When writing this paper, the variable remuneration for a 
bank branch manager, in one of the big Spanish banks, amounts to 23% of his total 
salary. 
CRD IV and Regulation 575/2013 have required new legislation,137 but, in the process 
of adapting the Spanish system to European law, the focus has remained on 
transparency, risk management and solvency and supervision requirements, rather 
than on consumer protection. The MCD seems to include this latter consideration 
(Recital 35 and art.7), with the aim to steer remuneration policies away from 
promoting reckless lending. The wording of art. 7.2 is very vague and art. 7.3 seems to 
forbid linking remuneration to the number or proportion of credit applications 
accepted only where the staff responsible for assessing creditworthiness is concerned. 
In Spain this can be construed to affect a limited number of people, when in practice 
others (such as bank branch managers) may have a direct influence on the final 
decision. 
The scoring system of big banks is approved by the Bank of Spain. Therefore, by 
means of risk management delegation, and as long as the scoring is positive, it 
is possible for bank branch managers to decide on granting a credit as long as it 
does not exceed a certain amount (for instance, €300,000), that the LTV is a 
maximum of 80% and that the client is in a position to pay 10% of the price of 
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purchase. Everything that escapes these parameters needs to be decided by 
the risk management department. On the other hand, bank branch managers 
may have an influence in determining the interest rate, which of course may 
alter the scoring. Part of the bank branch managers’ variable remuneration is 
dependent on the amount of credits granted, and the same applies to the sale 
forces in every branch. Although, as already mentioned, the proportion 
between fixed and variable salary is conservative in Spain, it should also be 
added that the difference between attaining all the targets necessary to receive 
the entire variable remuneration or not is important in day to day life: the fixed 
salary of a bank branch manager, with a staff of six people, may amount to (as 
little as) €40,000. 
The Draft Bill (art. 8) takes a curios approach to this matter. On the one hand, it bans 
tying remuneration to the number or proportion of applications accepted, but only for 
staff responsible for risk management. For other staff involved in the creditworthiness 
assessment and in the contracting process, it merely provides that the number or 
proportion of accepted applications must not be the predominant factor taken into 
account when setting their remuneration. We have doubts as to whether this 
adequately transposes the Directive. 
With regard to knowledge and skills (Directive, art. 9), although Mifid II and the ESMA 
Guidelines138 apply to investment products, it is understood that, due to the fact that 
commercial banks tend to carry out investment banking as well, around 80% of 
Spanish bank employees will be required to pass the tests set by these provisions. The 
Spanish Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (National Commission for the 
Securities Market) has shown its intention to apply them strictly.139 Even if the scope is 
different, it seems clear that if someone understands how a complex investment 
product operates, this person should also be in a position to prove adequate 
competence with regards to the aspects set out in Annex III MCD. However, this is not 
necessarily the case, so we understand that evaluation tools will have to be put in 
place as well in this area. The general practice in Spain (where unemployment is 
endemically high, and higher education is more accessible and more widespread than 
in other Member States) is to require job applicants to have a degree in Law, 
Economics or Business Administration. However, this does not, in our view, guarantee 
the level of market awareness and legal expertise that should be expected of 
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personnel dealing with credit agreements (whether over residential property or not). 
On the other hand, though, credit providers do have a choice of candidates, which 
ought to ensure competition. The Draft Bill simply delegates the matter to the 
Ministry, which must set the knowledge and skills requirements (art. 6). 
In the same line, there is a need for a clear separation between the role of the creditor 
and the role it carries out providing advisory services. In Spain, where banks have 
traditionally had many different offices or branches, people turned to their local bank 
manager (or even bank clerk) for financial advice, and the staff carried out this task 
perhaps mostly in good faith, but often without enough distance from the their own 
position in the bank and perhaps – although it is difficult to believe – without knowing 
what they were doing. An extreme example of this is the “scandal” of the massive 
placement of preferred stock in the hands of non-risk investors (mainly, elderly people) 
who were told that the shares functioned like a deposit, but with a higher yield, and 
that they would be able to sell them whenever they wanted and thus recover the 
invested capital.140 Staff stated that this is what they had been told. After the financial 
crisis, bank branch managers who had invested in preferred stock themselves were 
prevented from claiming compensation…141  
On the other hand, though, some big banks intentionally move their staff from one 
office to the other every few years, in order to prevent links with customers to become 
too personal. 
The Draft Bill (art. 9) provides that only those who are recognised and supervised as 
the Ministry determines will be able to provide advisory services and that, when so 
doing, the client must be informed of the fact, the cost for the client and the 
commission that the advisor may receive, directly or indirectly, from the lender. 
3) Regarding pre-contractual information, what changes does the Directive entail 
in: a) advertising (art.11); general information (art. 13) and ESIS (art. 14 and 
Annex II)? Does your country fall within the scope of art. 14.5 (where there was 
already in place a similar form to ESIS, containing “equivalent information 
requirements”)? How does ESIS work with your domestic binding offers or 
similar transparency documents? Has your system increased consumer 
protection by enlarging the reflection period or the right of withdrawal or has it 
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set an amount of time since receiving the ESIS (or equivalent) before which the 
consumer cannot enter into a binding agreement? Do you think adopting the 
ESIS decreases consumer protection in your legal system? When and how is the 
draft credit agreement available to consumers? 
Although most general consumer protection norms should have always applied to 
consumers entering into mortgage credits, their exclusion from various EU and 
domestic provisions led to the enactment of different regulations specifically designed 
for these. 
With regard to advertising, dedicated norms apply to financial services, including Order 
EHA/1718/2010,142 developed by Circular 6/2010 of the Bank of Spain, as amended,143 
without prejudice to the general rules on advertising. According to the above 
mentioned Law 2/2009 (art. 12), when advertising mortgage credits and reference is 
made to interest rates, the amount of the credit or other costs, the expression of the 
APRC is mandatory, including a representative example; this does not exclude the 
possibility of also specifying the interest rate, as long as one and other are separate 
and the functions thereof are clear. The magma of regulations on this point, with 
different positions in the hierarchy, is huge, but it is safe to say that all relevant aspects 
detailed in art. 11.2 are covered by the Spanish legislation, though by no means 
standardised. 
With regard to general information, the relevant provisions can be found in a 2011 
Order of the Ministry of Economy and Tax, on transparency and protection of clients of 
financial services,144 which develops the provisions of Law 2/2011, 4 March, on 
Sustainable Economy.145 This Order, as well as embracing the spirit of art. 13.1 MCD 
(art. 6), includes, for credit mortgages on homes (residential property) or credits the 
aim of which is to acquire or retain rights over land or in an existing or projected 
building (the wording is practically identical to that of art.3.1 MCD)146, a Pre-
contractual Information Form (FIPRE) that must be made available to the consumer by 
all commercial channels (art. 21 and Annex I). According to Law 2/2009, art. 13, the 
same content must be made available to consumers in the form of a brochure.  
The FIPRE in not yet binding on the creditor and must contain the data laid down in 
Annex I of the Order (attached as annex I to this paper). Comparing its content to that 
                                                          
142
 Order EHA/1718/2010, 11 June, on regulation and control over advertising of banking services and 
products (Ministry of Economy and Tax).  
143
 Circular n. 6/2010, 28 September (BOE 11 October 2010, n. 246; ref. BOE-A-2010-15521). 
144
 Order EHA/2899/2011, 28 October (Ministry of Economy and Tax, BOE 29 October 2011, n. 261, p. 
113242). 
145
 BOE 5 March 2011, n. 55 (Ref. BOE-A-2011-4117).  
146
 However, art. 19 of the Order seems to limit its scope to cases where immovable property has been 
mortgaged, which would need to be adapted to the broader scope of art. 3.1 (b) MCD. 
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of art. 13 MCD, the instructions to complete the FIPRE are in line with the European 
norm, except with regard to the general warning concerning possible consequences of 
non-compliance, although the crisis has led many creditors to include such warnings. 
The next step toward entering into a mortgage credit agreement is a Personalised 
Information Form (FIPER) provided for by art. 22 of the Order and detailed in Annex II 
(attached to this paper as annex II). The FIPER is given to the client once the needs, 
preferences and situation has been explained to the bank, with the aim of assisting the 
client in the choice of the most convenient offer. Comparing this to the ESIS, the latter 
is longer and more detailed, but the core aspects are covered by the Spanish FIPRE, 
including all the warnings and, with the same spirit as the Directive, precluding 
alterations thereof (any additional information should be provided in a separate 
document). Save for slight exceptions and the fact that the scope of these provisions 
(art. 19 of the Order) does not include all credits covered by art. 3.1 (b) MCD, even the 
order of the items included in the form is almost identical to that of the ESIS. This is 
probably explained by the fact that the Order was passed once the Proposal for the 
MCD had already been published. It could be held that the Spanish Form falls within 
the scope of art. 14.5 MCD. However, in practice the forms are not as illustrative as the 
legal framework requires. They show figures and contain the necessary warnings, but 
the language is not always as clear and comprehensible as one would hope. Plus a 
certain lack of uniformity, which may be down to the way interest rates are generally 
set in Spain, can mislead consumers. For example, in Spanish mortgage credits it is 
usual for the interest rate to be variable, indexed to the Euribor, upon which a 
percentage is added, but this percentage may be reduced if certain conditions are met 
(such as, inter alia, having your salary paid into the same bank, taking out a credit card 
or an insurance with them). Most banks include the general interest rate before 
reductions in the section of the Form that deals with interest, and the reductions may 
be specified at the end. Exceptionally, some banks (mainly foreign) include the interest 
rate taking into account all possible reductions in the section dedicated to the interest 
rate and then, at the end of the form, they specify that if certain conditions are not 
met, the interest rate will be higher. This obviously does not allow the consumer to 
compare offers easily and leads to confusion (typically, the consumer may believe that 
the second bank is offering a better rate). We doubt whether the ESIS solves this 
particular problem, and others of this style that may arise both in Spain and elsewhere. 
The next step towards the credit agreement is the binding offer (art. 23 of the 2011 
Order) that the client may request. This may be handed to the client at the same time 
as the FIPER, in which case they will be in a single document. The content of the 
binding offer is identical to that of the FIPER, except for the fact that it is produced 
once the appraisal of the property and the land registry checks have taken place, and 
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the creditworthiness assessment has been made. Also, the offer must expressly state 
that it is binding on the creditor and it must state its duration, which cannot be under 
14 days. There is no longer a period during which the client cannot accept the offer 
and it is not unheard of that the client has been given the binding offer at the notary’s 
office on the day when the transaction is completed. Nevertheless, it is the notary’s 
obligation to check that the binding offer was given to the client in good time before 
the credit agreement is entered into and that the terms of the offer coincide with 
those of the notarised contract. If they do not, the client may demand the contract to 
be adapted to the terms of the binding offer. In any case, it seems to us that the time 
limits laid down by the Spanish legislation already comply with those provided for in 
art. 14.6. MCD147  
As already hinted, the final step towards completing a credit agreement – and the 
moment when the consumer is bound – takes place by signing a notarised deed, which 
will then be registered (exceptionally in the Spanish system, in our case there is no 
mortgage unless the deed is entered into the Land Registry). The notaries’ functions at 
this stage are important, not only concerning the correctness of the documents before 
them, but also in order to make sure that the consumer has understood the terms of 
the agreement. Certainly, some notaries carry out this task very carefully, but this is 
not always the case and it undoubtedly was not in many instances during the property 
boom. The draft deed will have been available to the consumer for three days (five in 
Catalonia) at the notaries’ office, but this still does not ensure that the client: a) takes 
the time to go and read it; and, b) understands between 50 and 80 pages of legal 
language. This raises the question as to why not standardise the actual agreement, and 
not only the pre-contractual information requirements. 
 
On the other hand, it will be interesting to see what happens with the reflection period 
or right of withdrawal (art. 14.6 MCD), since in Spain the purchase of the property and 
the mortgage are signed before the notary the same day.  
A rather quaint feature of Spanish legislation, as amended by Law 1/2013, is that, 
under certain circumstances, it requires a handwritten declaration to be included in 
the notarial deed whereby the consumer declares that adequate information has been 
given concerning the risks involved in the operation. This applies when the mortgage 
credit refers to “homes” or to the acquisition or maintenance of rights over land or 
                                                          
147
 In spite of this, it should be noted that, in comparison with the previous 1994 Order on transparency 
(Order 5 may 1994, BOE n. 112, 11 May 1994), the level of protection for consumers decreases, since up 
until 2007, when Law 41/2007 came into force, it was compulsory, with regard to mortgages under 
€150,253.03, for the bank to provide the binding offer, even if the client did not demand it, and it had to 
be signed by the client at least three days prior to entering into the credit agreement. 
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over existing or projected buildings (the similarity in the wording to art. 3.1 MCD leads 
to believe that vivienda should be understood to mean residential immovable 
property), when the borrower is a natural person and (a) the credit is designated in a 
foreign currency, or (b) as it includes floor and/or cap interest rates or similar schemes, 
or (c) it is linked to an interest rate fluctuation limitation instrument (such as a SWAP). 
The Bank of Spain has produced a standardised text that the notary shows the 
borrower so that it can be copied.148 Needless to say, it is very extravagant to be 
handwriting anything in the usually formal environment of the notary’s office and with 
all the tension involved in the entire operation. Plus, it is dubious whether this scheme 
will really guarantee that the debtor has understood the terms and conditions. And 
even if he or she has, perhaps there was no other option and therefore free consent 
may still be challenged (we are thinking of cases where creditors and consumers agree 
to modify the mortgage credit agreement in order to allow the debtor some breathing 
space; if an interest rate floor is imposed by the creditor, the stressed debtor may have 
understood, but still had no other option). 
The Draft Bill (art. 5) is non-committal and simply delegates to the Ministry the task of 
developing the transparency requirements that it lays down, in very vague terms. The 
ESIS is not even mentioned, except in an ancillary manner in the article dedicated to 
loans denominated in a foreign currency (art. 10). 
4) Does the Directive bring about significant changes with regard to tying and 
bundling practices (art. 12)? 
It is generally understood that tying practices, although not expressly forbidden by 
Spanish legislation in this area (in fact, art. 12 of Order EHA/2899/2011 openly accepts 
them), are very rare in practice. Art. 8 of Law 2/1981 and art. 10 of Decree 716/2009 
require the mortgaged asset to be insured against damages for the amount it was 
appraised. This is a requisite for the securitisation of mortgage loans, but since most 
banks wish to keep their options open in this respect, it is a general practice to 
demand such an insurance to be undertaken. However, there is no obligation to take 
                                                          
148
 The text is: “Soy conocedor de que mi préstamo hipotecario: ii(i) establece limitaciones [indicar 
cuál/es: suelos y/o techos] a la variabilidad del tipo de interés; i(ii) lleva asociada la contratación de un 
instrumento de cobertura del riesgo de tipo de interés [indicar cuál], y (iii) está concedido en la/s 
siguiente/s divisa/s [indicar cuál/es]. Además, he sido advertido por la entidad prestamista y por el 
notario actuante, cada uno dentro de su ámbito de actuación, de los posibles riesgos del contrato y, en 
particular, de que: a) el tipo de interés de mi préstamo, a pesar de ser variable, nunca se beneficiará de 
descensos del tipo de interés de referencia por debajo del [límite mínimo del tipo de interés variable 
limitado]; b) las eventuales liquidaciones periódicas asociadas al instrumento de cobertura del préstamo 
pueden ser negativas, y c) mi préstamo no se expresa en euros y, por lo tanto, el importe en euros que 
necesitaré para pagar cada cuota variará en función del tipo de cambio de [moneda del 
préstamo/euro].” Banco de España, Guía de acceso al préstamo hipotecario, annex IX, 75 (available at: 
http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/Secciones/Publicaciones/Folletos/Fic/Guia_hipotecaria_2013.pdf ). 
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up the insurance that the creditor may provide. Having said this, it is usual for banks to 
offer a reduction in the interest rate if the client takes up the insurance policy provided 
by the bank or a subsidiary thereof. The same applies, in general, to life insurance, 
unemployment or default insurance, credit cards, salaries being paid into a bank 
account held at the bank, etc. Therefore, in general we are talking about bundling 
practices, not tying practices, even though in reality they may amount to the same for 
the consumer. We believe art. 12.4 MCD is worded in such a way that it allows the 
creditor to condition the concession of the credit to the fact that the consumer holds a 
default insurance or, as stated above, an insurance against damages to the property. 
The Draft Bill (art. 7) expressly forbids tying practices, but it incorporates the exception 
provided for by art. 12.4 MCD and it delegates to the Bank of Spain the power to 
authorise practices defined in art. 12.3, and to the Ministry for the definition of 
financial products that may be tied to the loan (the terms are vague, but we imagine 
this refers to the possible exclusions as per art. 12.2). 
5) 5. What changes does art. 17 entail with regard to the APRC? Is your system 
familiar with arrangements such as those referred to in art. 17, paragraphs 5 
and 6? 
The first four subsections of art. 17 are in essence already implemented by art. 31 of 
Order EHA/2899/2011, which, as already mentioned, was inspired by the Proposal for 
the Directive on mortgage credits. 
This brought about a change with regard to the cost of maintaining a specific account 
to service the credit, which must be included in the APRC. This is, of course, a general 
practice and art. 17 MCD allows for a charge to accrue. The solution given by the Bank 
of Spain, prior to the already mentioned Order EHA/2899/2011 (which came into force 
on 29 April 2012) and the Circular of the Bank of Spain 5/2012, 27 June, was to 
understand that no commission could be charged for opening or maintaining this type 
of account when the bank required it to service the credit.149 In the light of the new 
provisions, the Bank of Spain has held that such commissions can be charged as long as 
the client is informed before entering into the agreement of the requirement of a tied 
account and of the part of the total cost corresponding to its maintenance; it is also 
required that both aspects are included in the credit agreement and that the bank is 
barred from modifying the commission for the duration of the credit agreement.150 In 
                                                          
149
 Bank of Spain, Memoria del Servicio de Reclamaciones, 2010, 120. Available at:  
http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/Secciones/Publicaciones/PublicacionesAnuales/MemoriaServicioReclama
ciones/10/MSR2010.pdf   
150
 Bank of Spain, Memoria del Servicio de Reclamaciones, 2012, 353. Available at:  
http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/Secciones/Publicaciones/PublicacionesAnuales/MemoriaServicioReclama
ciones/12/MSB_2012.pdf   
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all respects, it would have been better for the consumer if the domestic norm prior to 
the 2011 Order had stood. 
Arrangements such as those referred to in art. 17.5 are not usual in Spain. The interest 
rate is set from the start for the duration of the credit agreement. Even if there are 
different interest periods (for instance, a fixed rate for the first five years, followed by 
a variable rate), the parties agree upon the rules of the game in advance. It could even 
be held that there is no agreement on the price of the credit if the interest rate had 
not been decided from the beginning and for the duration.  
We believe that the only substantial change will derive from the implementation of 
art. 17.6 MCD, with regard to the inclusion of potential variations of the APRC in the 
ESIS where the interest rate is not fixed (i.e. the usual case for Spanish mortgage 
credits). 
The APRC is not dealt with directly by the Draft Bill. It only refers to it with regard to 
intermediaries. 
6) The creditworthiness assessment needs to yield a positive result. Otherwise, 
the credit cannot be granted (art. 18). Has this been transposed by means of 
prudential norms or by civil law norms, or both? What are the consequences of 
infringing this rule in your legal system (i.e. what happens if the credit has been 
made available in spite of a negative creditworthiness assessment)? And what 
are the consequences for the creditor if the consumer provides false or 
incomplete information? 
Arts. 18.4 and 20.3 suggest that the creditor’s negligence in carrying out the 
assessment or in demanding the relevant information leads to the credit being 
maintained, which would probably entail that, even if domestic law attaches 
nullity to the infringement of imperative rules, in this case the Directive 
considers that maintaining the validity of the credit in the consumer’s best 
interests. Nullity is certainly a bad solution for the consumer, but it remains to 
be seen if being tied to a loan he probably cannot afford is a good result. This 
difficult question is not solved by the Directive, which seems to only offer a 
solution through sanctions and public disclosure thereof (art. 38). 
In spite of art. 18.3, art. 19 grants property valuation an important role in the 
context of the creditworthiness assessment. Does your legal system allow 
internal appraisal of property, i.e. that the creditor carries out the valuation, 
albeit under certain conditions? 
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As pointed out elsewhere,151 the Catalan government implemented some measures of 
the MCD for this region by means of Law 20/2014, 29 December, which amended the 
Catalan Consumer Code 2010. The goal of the act was to protect consumers 
throughout the mortgage loan cycle, i.e. it covered the advertising of mortgage lending 
products, the pre-contractual stage, the conclusion of the contract and the entire 
contractual phase. Notwithstanding the fact that some of these rules are no longer in 
force due to a constitutional complaint lodged by the Spanish government before the 
Spanish Constitutional Court152, the Catalan lawmaker implemented the original 
wording of the MCD as far as the creditworthiness assessment is concerned, thus 
prohibiting lenders located in Catalonia to grant the credit should this assessment be 
negative (art. 263-2). This legal framework, which is one of the possibilities the Spanish 
lawmaker could adopt when implementing the MCD, raises a number of relevant 
questions related not only to consumer law rules, but also to contractual law rules and 
access to housing.  
The major issue at stake153 is to what extent the validity of the contract may be 
affected if the lender grants the loan in spite of the creditworthiness assessment being 
negative (in the wording of the Catalan Consumer Code or the prospective wording of 
the Spanish law implementing the MCD) or “the result of the creditworthiness 
assessment indicates that the obligations resulting from the credit agreement are not 
likely to be met in the manner required under that agreement” (in the current wording 
of the MCD). There are several approaches to such issue. 
The first option would be to render the mortgage loan void. In spite of the 
administrative nature of the Catalan Consumer Code, the breach of administrative 
rules could lead to the mortgage loan being rendered void on the basis of art. 6.3 of 
the Spanish Civil Code,154 as some Supreme Court decisions have already done (11 June 
2010
155
, 19 November 2009
156
 and 10 October 2008
157
). 
                                                          
151
 See above (introduction to Part II) and see also S. Nasarre Aznar; H. Simón Moreno, ‘Un paso más en 
la protección de los deudores hipotecarios de vivienda: la Directiva 2014/17/UE y la reforma del Código 
de Consumo de Cataluña por Ley 20/2014’ (2015) 139 Revista de Derecho Bancario y Bursátil 11-55. 
152
 See above fn. 134.  
153
 That is, leaving aside the actual parameters that should be taken into account when carrying out a 
creditworthiness assessment. In this respect, it is relevant to note that the EBA Guidelines, 1 June 2015 
2015 have already come into force, but are not very concrete either. Text available at:  
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1092161/EBA-GL-2015-
11+Guidelines+on+creditworthiness+assessment.pdf  
154
 “Acts contrary to mandatory and prohibitive rules shall be null and void by operation of law, save 
where such rules should provide for a different effect in the event of violation”. 
155
 ECLI:ES:TS:2010:3061. 
156
 ECLI:ES:TS:2008:6456. 
157
 ECLI:ES:TS:2008:5227. 
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Two Supreme Court decisions dated 22 February 2013 and 18 June 2012158 held that 
the annulment of a loan contract for breach of the Law on Usury 1908 affects not only 
the collateral (i.e. the mortgage), but also the contracts that have been concluded on 
the basis of such mortgage loan, such as the sale contract by which the consumer has 
acquired the dwelling. The same takes place in consumer credit agreements that 
finance the purchase of goods or services: both (the sale contract and the consumer 
loan) are deemed to be the same economic operation.159 In these cases, the consumer 
would be entitled to claim the taxes paid in consideration of the act declared void (i.e. 
the sale contract) to the competent public authority, such as the stamp duty (art. 57.1 
of Royal Decree Legislative 1/1993, of 24 September) or the value added tax (art. 
80.dos Law 37/1992 of December 28). In any event, the borrower would be entitled to 
claim responsibility for damages to the lender. 
It is true, however, that the wording of the Directive suggests that maintaining the 
validity of the credit is the best solution for consumers. Therefore, another option 
would be for the Spanish lawmaker is to take the regulation already in force as a 
starting point. The consumer’s creditworthiness assessment is already provided for 
under Spanish law, in particular in art. 29.1 of Law 2/2011, 4 March, on sustainable 
economy, and in art. 18 of Order EHA 2899/2011, 28 October, on transparency and 
protection of clients of banking services (the Circular of the of Bank of Spain 3/2014 
established that more stringent granting rules should be adopted when dealing with 
multicurrency mortgages). The 2011 Order, however, establishes that the 
creditworthiness assessment shall be performed without prejudice to the freedom to 
contract which, in its substantive aspects and with the limitations that may derive from 
other legal regulations, must preside over the relations between the credit institutions 
and the clients. Art. 18 of the Order also stated that the creditworthiness assessment 
would not, under any circumstances, affect the full validity and effect of the 
agreements, and neither would it imply the creditor’s liability for the client’s lack of 
performance of the obligations under the credit agreement. This provision allows the 
parties to conclude the mortgage loan on the basis of art. 1255 CC160 regardless of the 
result of the creditworthiness assessment, so non-compliance with such obligation by 
lenders (the one imposed by Directive 2014/17/EU) would not have an impact on the 
                                                          
158
 ECLI:ES:TS:2013:867 and ECLI:ES:TS:2012:5966. 
159
 Supreme Court Decision 4 March 2011 (ECLI:ES:TS:2011:1083); Madrid Provincial Court 5 December 
2011 (AC 2012\212); Tarragona Court of Appeal 3 November 2005 (JUR 2006\91839). 
160
 The contracting parties may establish any covenants, clauses and conditions deemed convenient, 
provided that they are not contrary to the laws, to morals or to public policy. 
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validity of the contract. Taking into account the lenders’ behaviour during the housing 
boom, such legal framework did not have any deterrent effect.161 
Insofar as art. 18 of the 2011 Order expressly allows the credit agreement to be 
entered into despite a negative creditworthiness assessment, it should be deemed 
inconsistent with the MCD. The goals of the Directive, e. g. the prevention of 
household over-indebtedness, which has led to severe social and economic 
consequences in Spain (see above, Part I), are not consistent at first blush with 
maintaining the validity of mortgage loans disbursed in breach of art. 18 MCD. Taking 
as an example the recent amendment of art. 83 RDL 1/2007, its original wording stated 
that unfair terms should be legally null and void and shall be considered ineffective 
and that the Judge declaring the nullity of said terms should draw up the contract and 
exercise moderating powers with regards to the rights and obligations of the parties. 
This provision was sharply criticised in relation to the treatment of default interest 
rates (see above), as judges reduced the amount thereof instead of prohibiting lenders 
from claiming any compensation at all. The Spanish Law 3/2014, 27 March, which 
implemented Directive 2011/83/EU, changed the wording of art. 83 RDL 1/2007 by 
establishing that unfair terms shall be null and void and shall not be revised later by a 
judge, in line with the ECJ decision 14 June 2012.162 Otherwise the deterrent effect of 
consumer law rules would be non-existent. Taking this example as a starting point, if 
the Spanish lawmaker aims to truly protect consumers when transposing the MCD, it 
has been held that the most suitable option would be to render the mortgage loan 
void due to the existence of a public interest or general principle of law that deserves 
such protection, i.e. consumer protection.163 Otherwise over-indebtedness would not 
be avoided. 
However, other options may be considered, in order to maintain the validity of the 
contract, as nullity could be detrimental to the consumer’s interest (see below), and 
we believe such is the idea underlying the provision in art. 18.4 MCD. In addition, it 
must be taken into consideration that the parties are free to conclude a contract or 
not, which constitutes a manifestation of the freedom of contract, a general principle 
of European contract law.164 Thus, the implementation of the MCD should reconcile 
                                                          
161
 As pointed out by K.J. Albiez Dohrmann, ‘Opciones legales para la transposición pendiente de la 
Directiva 2014/17/UE’ (2016) 3 Revista de Derecho Privado 62. 
162
 Case C-618/10. 
163
 It was the opinion held by S. Nasarre Aznar; H. Simón Moreno, ‘Un paso más’ 35 ff.; also by F. 
Zunzunegui, ‘Evaluación de la solvencia en la concesión de créditos hipotecarios’ (2014) 16 Teoría y 
Derecho. Revista de Pensamiento Jurídico 151, argues in relation to the provision of the MCD that the 
mortgage loan should be rendered void. 
164
 J. Basedow, ‘Freedom of contract in the European Union’ (2008) 6 European Review of Private Law 
905 ff. At  921; and H. Simón Moreno, ‘Disposiciones generales’, in A. Vaquer Aloy, E. Bosch Capdevila, 
M. Paz Sánchez González (eds.), Derecho europeo de los contratos: libros II y IV del marco común de 
referencia (Barcelona: Atelier, 2012), vol. 1, 2012. 77 ff. 
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consumer protection rules with the freedom of contract, as the current Spanish legal 
framework does.165 As a result, intermediate solutions may be adopted so as to 
maintain the validity of the contract, on the one hand, and to protect consumers’ 
rights by imposing some penalties to lenders that could be effective from a cost-
benefit analysis point of view, on the other. 
Recital 58 MCD supports the idea that if the creditworthiness assessment has been 
incorrectly conducted due to the lender’s fault, the lender shall not be entitled to 
terminate the credit agreement. However, the Directive does not shed light on several 
questions, in different scenarios. 
a) If consumers have delivered all the information required by lenders in an 
accurate manner, but the creditworthiness assessment has not been carried 
out properly, e.g. the lender has not required all the information needed in 
advance or the assessment has been done without following the standards, this 
could lead to an initial positive assessment that would be actually negative had 
it been carried out properly. Lenders, as already pointed out, cannot put an end 
to the credit agreement. Would consumers, however, be entitled to terminate 
the credit agreement after the conclusion of the contract in such 
circumstances? In our view, consumers would be entitled to terminate the 
credit agreement on the basis of either fraudulent misrepresentation (art. 1269 
Spanish CC), had the lender intentionally induced the consumer to conclude the 
mortgage loan, or the rules of mistake (art. 1266 Spanish CC), had the lender 
simply been negligent when carrying out the assessment. This possibility would 
be allowed by art. 20.3 MCD. The consumer might also claim compensation, 
but it is difficult to envisage scenarios where damages would be high enough to 
set-off the obligation to return the loaned capital, in which case the consumer’s 
position would not be ideal. On the other hand, partial nullity of the credit 
agreement, whereby the principal would be reduced to the amount that the 
consumer could reasonably be expected to pay back under the terms of the 
loan, could be a solution, with a powerful deterrent effect, albeit preventing 
unjust enrichment by the consumer. 
But still other solutions may be envisaged. 
An administrative penalty or sanction may be imposed on lenders. This was the 
solution adopted by the Catalan Consumer Code. The breach of the above-
mentioned duty was deemed to be a “serious infringement” by art. 332-3.1 c) 
                                                          
165
 See E. Muñiz Espada, ‘La directive “crédit hypothécaire”’(2015, mars-avril) 2 Revue de Droit Bancaire 
et Financier 104, who argues that the current wording of Directive 2014/17/EU goes against the 
freedom of contract and the freedom of business. 
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and the penalty could amount to up to €100,000 (art. 333-1 b). The Andalusian 
Law 3/2016 also provides for penalties in the event of infringement of the 
provisions thereof.166 As a matter of fact, this is the solution adopted by art. 
34.1 of Spanish Law 16/2011, 24 June, on Consumer Credit Contracts, in 
relation to the duty of lenders to assess the borrower’s creditworthiness (art. 
14). Another form of penalty imposed by supervisors could be devised by 
means of the rules on loan provisioning.  
Second, some lender’s faculties may be limited, by losing the right to declare 
the early termination of the mortgage loan, or the right to claim the interest 
rate or the default interest rate. This is the approach taken by the French art. 
L341-27 Code de la consommation,167 as amended by the Ordonnance n°2016-
351, 25 March 2016, and it has been defended by scholars,168 as administrative 
penalties are not genuine deterrents with preventive effect. It is also 
considered an efficient measure by the World Bank.169 However, the ECJ 
decision 27 March 2014170 pointed out in relation to the transposition in France 
of the Consumer Directive 2008/48/EU –which established as a penalty for the 
non-performance of the creditworthiness assessment the forfeiture of the 
entitlement to contractual interest- that any measure should be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive, so a cost-benefit analysis should be carried out 
before the implementation of any such measure.171 
                                                          
166
 Law 3/2016, 9 June, art. 20 and final provision 2. 
167
 “Peut être déchu du droit aux intérêts dans la proportion fixée par le juge, jusqu'à un montant ne 
pouvant excéder, pour chacun des manquements énumérés ci-après, 30 % des intérêts et plafonné à 30 
000 euros, le prêteur qui accorde un crédit : 1° Sans avoir fourni à l'emprunteur les explications 
adéquates permettant à celui-ci de déterminer si le contrat de crédit et les éventuels services 
accessoires sont adaptés à ses besoins et à sa situation financière à partir des informations prévues à 
l'article L. 313-11 ; ou 2° Sans avoir, en méconnaissance de l'article L. 313-12, mis en garde 
l'emprunteur, sur le risque spécifique que peut induire pour lui le contrat compte tenu de sa situation 
financière, lorsqu'un tel risque a été identifié ; ou 3° Sans avoir respecté les conditions prévues aux 
articles L. 313-16 à L. 313-18, applicables en matière d'évaluation de la solvabilité de l'emprunteur. Le 
prêteur qui accorde un crédit sans réaliser l'étude de solvabilité mentionnée à l'article L. 313-16 peut 
être déchu du droit aux intérêts, en totalité ou dans la proportion fixée par le juge”. The World Bank, 
Responsible Lending Overview of Regulatory Tools (October  2013). Available at  
http://documentos.bancomundial.org/curated/es/2013/10/18639527/responsible-lending-overview-
regulatory-tools 
168
 See M. C. Mayorga Toledano, ‘Obligaciones de la entidad de crédito en la concesión de crédito 
adecuado a la solvencia y capacidad de endeudamiento del cliente’, in A. I. Berrocal Lanzarot; C. Callejo 
Rodríguez; J.T. Raga Gil; M.S. Flores Doña (eds.), El Préstamo Hipotecario y el Mercado del Crédito en la 
Unión Europea (Madrid: Dykinson, 2016) 353 ff. 
169
 The World Bank. Responsible Lending. Overview of Regulatory Tools, October 2013, 46. Available at:  
http://documentos.bancomundial.org/curated/es/2013/10/18639527/responsible-lending-overview-
regulatory-tools  
170
 Case C - 565/12. Le Crédit Lyonnais SA v Fesih Kalhan. 
171
 The Court stated that the penalty in question cannot be regarded as genuinely dissuasive if the 
Héctor Simón Moreno & Miriam Anderson  Working paper 8/2017 
42 
 
It would also be possible to attach negative consequences in the event of 
insolvency proceedings, so that the mortgage loan lost its special preference 
and became a subordinated claim, to be paid in the last place (together with 
credits to family members, for instance) (arts. 89 ff. Spanish Insolvency Law 
22/2003, 9 July). 
Another solution could be the impossibility of registering the mortgage, which 
under Spanish law would amount to the lender losing the collateral (and the 
credit standing for the agreed duration at the lower mortgage loan interest 
rates). However, this would place a surveillance obligation upon Land Registrars 
that might surpass the role they are called to carry out. In this line, it has been 
suggested that the lender should lose any added securities and personal 
guarantors should be deemed discharged; this is probably a good path to 
explore, since quite often irresponsible lending appears hand in hand with 
excessive guarantees that the creditor demands.172 
b)  If consumers deliberately provide inaccurate or false information at the time 
when the creditworthiness assessment is made or intentionally do not provide 
information that would have led to a negative assessment of creditworthiness, 
lenders shall be entitled to terminate the credit agreement on the basis of the 
rules of fraudulent misrepresentation or mistake (arts. 1266 and 1269 Spanish 
CC), which again would be in line with art. 20.3 MCD. In this case, the consumer 
would not be entitled to terminate the credit agreement, as this would infringe 
the venire contra factum proprium principle (no-one may act against his own 
previous conduct).173 
c) Another scenario is the following: both lender and consumer are aware of the 
fact that the latter is not likely to pay back the mortgage loan, as shown by the 
creditworthiness assessment. Would the parties be able to conclude such 
agreement voluntarily without further negative consequences? From our point 
of view, the main purpose of consumer law is the achievement of an adequate 
consumer protection. In this sense, after the provision of pre-contractual 
information and the creditworthiness assessment consumers should be 
informed enough to face the consequences of the non-performance of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
amounts which the creditor is likely to receive following application of the penalty are not significantly 
lower than those which it could have received if it had complied with its obligation. If the penalty of 
forfeiture of entitlement to interest is weakened, or even entirely undermined, the penalty will not be 
genuinely dissuasive, contrary to the provisions of Directive 2008/48. 
172
 Andalusian Law 3/2016, 9 June, art. 13.2 requires guarantors’ creditworthiness assessment to be 
carried out in the same terms as for the borrower. 
173
 See H. Simón Moreno, ‘El ejercicio de los derechos: influencia de la reforma del Título preliminar del 
Código civil de 1973-74 y la pervivencia de su ideología tras el proceso constitucional’, in J. Rams Albesa 
(ed.), Tratado de Derecho Civil, Normas Civiles y derecho subjetivo (Madrid: Iustel, 2014), vol. 2, 406 ff. 
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mortgage loan, so the question is whether the parties should be prevented 
from agreeing on assuming the risk of the debtor´s default. We believe that if 
the law allowed such agreement without further consequences, the main goal 
of the MCD in this respect, i.e. providing a high level of consumer protection in 
the area of credit agreements relating to immovable property, would be 
undermined. Moreover, we believe such a rule would be inconsistent with art. 
18 MCD. 
Lastly, the transposition of the MCD will imply far-reaching changes in relation to 
housing access, as it could prevent many households from accessing mortgage loans, 
and ultimately, home ownership, as the Council of Mortgage Lenders pointed out in 
2011.174 The measures laid down the MCD are likely to increase the transaction costs 
lenders face, which ultimately will be paid by consumers. As a matter of fact, creditors 
opposed the introduction of such an obligation to assess creditworthiness as it could 
lead to a potential increase in litigation.175 This measure is likely to have a negative 
impact in countries with limited alternative forms of tenure to homeownership, such 
as Spain (see above), where tenancy is not a real alternative to homeownership. Only 
the Autonomous Community of Catalonia has introduced new land tenures so as to 
make housing access more affordable through its Law 19/2015. These are the so-called 
temporary ownership (propiedad temporal) and shared ownership (propiedad 
compartida), which provide tenure security as well as avoiding consumer over-
indebtedness. However, as our readers are probably expecting to learn by now, this 
Catalan act has also been challenged by the Spanish caretaker government before the 
Constitutional Court concerning the provisions on temporary ownership.176 
The Draft Bill refers vaguely to the creditworthiness assessment when delegating to 
the Ministry the development of certain aspects, including “adequate attention to the 
                                                          
174
 “An obligation to deny credit on this basis alone would result in the unjustified exclusion of borrowers 
from credit, for example, young professionals with good prospects and first time buyers with a third 
party guarantee. Despite the assurance in recital 25 we are concerned that it would also suggest that 
there was a ‘right to credit’ based on a positive creditworthiness assessment which could lead to legal 
uncertainty and litigation”, and also that “First and foremost, a legal obligation to deny a credit in the 
event of a negative creditworthiness assessment would result in increased potential lender liability and 
an increased risk of litigation, where subsequent interpretation by national courts is likely to penalise 
lenders. This would ultimately result in higher interest rates for consumers, as lenders are forced to price 
this risk into their products”. Report available at www.cml.org.uk. 
175
 Preliminary EBF position on the Proposal for a Directive on credit agreements relating to residential 
property, Brussels, 31 January 2012: “Although the possibility to refuse to grant credit is already the case 
in practice the EBF takes the view that given the long - term contractual relationship between the lender 
and the borrower, it should not be made a legal obligation as this could lead to a potential increase in 
litigation where national courts would most likely be required to rule on the matter decades after the 
credit was actually granted”, 4. Available at http://www.ebf-fbe.eu. 
176
 Tribunal Constitucional, 24 May 2016 (BOE n. 134, 3 June 2016, p. 36605; BOE-A-2016-5336) 
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borrower’s income in comparison to the obligations undertaken due to the loan” (art. 
5.1.e).  
With regards to property appraisals, Law 41/2007 (arts. 3 and 3.ter 3.bis Law 2/1981) 
aimed to regulate the behaviour of real estate appraisers, and RD 716/2009, 24 April, 
established that all properties should be appraised before issuing covered bonds or 
securitising (art. 8). As this legal framework was called into question by the Spanish 
ombudsman,177 Law 1/2013 amended Law 2/1981 once again. It imposed on appraisal 
companies the duty to have appropriate mechanisms to promote the independence of 
the valuation activity and avoid conflicts of interest, if at least 10% of the appraisal 
company’s total income in a given period of time (to be established by regulation) 
derives from a business relationship with a credit institution or a group of credit 
institutions, provided that such credit institution or group has issued mortgage 
securities. The Bank of Spain Circular 3/2014, 30 July,178 on credit institutions and 
credit rating firms and services, has introduced new mechanisms so as to achieve more 
independence in appraisals, such as the minimum content of the internal code of 
conduct that appraisal companies with a close commercial relationship with a credit 
institution (the already mentioned 10% of income proceeding from one client), and 
credit institutions that provide appraisal services, must have. Such legal framework 
seems to have increased the independence of appraisers: statistics from the Bank of 
Spain showed that appraisers linked to financial institutions were in charge of up to 
21% of all appraisals in 2011, whereas it accounted for 44% the previous year.179 
Indeed, there were 58 appraisal entities in 2011, of which a dozen were linked to 
financial entities, mainly savings banks. The number of such entities declined to 7 in 
2012180 and to only 3 in 2013181 (there were 36 active appraisal companies). 
It is therefore fair to say that nowadays in Spain there is a specific legal framework for 
appraisal companies, appraisers are monitored and must meet some compulsory 
requirements to operate, they are supervised by a public entity (the Bank of Spain) and 
insurance is compulsory. Probably this is why the Draft Bill (art. 5.1.f) only mentions 
appraisal in vague terms, delegating to the Ministry of Economy the task of laying 
down mechanisms that guarantee independence and prevent undue influence and 
conflicts of interest. We believe the job is considered to be already done. 
                                                          
177
 DEFENSOR DEL PUEBLO, Crisis económica y deudores hipotecarios: actuaciones y propuestas del 
Defensor del Pueblo (January 2012), 23. 
178
 BOE n. 185, 31 July 2014; available at: https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2014-8189. 
179
 Source: Diario Abierto 25 January 2012, El Banco de España logra que las sociedades de tasación 
dependan menos de la banca (http://www.diarioabierto.es/70079/banco-espana-sociedades-tasacion-
banca).  
180
 Bank of Spain, Boletín Económico (July-August 2013) 153. Available at www.bde.es.  
181
 Bank of Spain, Boletín Económico (July-August 2014) 114-115. Available at www.bde.es. 
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7) The number of consumers trapped by foreign currency loans varies throughout 
the EU. However, it is probably fair to say that most consumers did not 
understand the product they were acquiring, hence why transparency and 
financial education are essential in this area. The Directive demands that there 
is in place an exchange rate limitation arrangement or that the consumer has 
the opportunity to convert to a more familiar currency (art. 23). Does 
complying with these requisites solve the problems experienced by consumers 
in your country? 
As stated above, foreign currency mortgages have not been generalised in Spain (in 
fact, it was often UK banks offering them), but the outcome of the relatively few 
credits denominated in a foreign currency has usually been fatal for the borrower. In 
the typical scenario, a consumer paid a fair amount of money (between €4,000 and 
€10,000) to “financial advisors” who recommended a certain foreign currency 
mortgage. The variation in the exchange rates led to the capital owed to grow 
exponentially. There was always the possibility to convert to another currency, but the 
commission for doing so was astronomic. At this stage, the “financial advisors” had 
disappeared from the face of the earth and yet the bank was covered by the fact that 
the client had received independent advice. It was and still is a dead end for the 
consumer, unless the judicial path is followed. It is obvious that the consumer required 
more information, but it is to be seen whether the ESIS and art. 23 MCD attain this 
result. We believe that, in the Spanish context, it is rather a question of financial 
education, and the common sense notion that if something is much cheaper than 
elsewhere, there may be a catch to it. Plus, one of the main problems was the 
commission charged for the currency conversion, which the MCD does not address, 
leaving the matter, in our view, to the general rules on unfair terms.182 
The Draft Bill does not address this matter either. In art. 10 it basically copies art. 23 
MCD, opting for the alternatives in currency conversion when consumers are involved, 
and adding that where the loan is not granted to consumers, the possibility of 
conversion may be substituted or complemented by instruments that limit the rate of 
exchange risk.  
 
 
                                                          
182
 A Supreme Court Judgment dated 30 June 2015 (ECLI:ES:TS:2015:3002) considered that the client, 
involved in property transactions, did not operate as a consumer in that case, but that the Mifid rules 
applied due to the complex nature of the product. Interestingly, although the bank had not complied 
with the Mifid requirements, the court held that the client’s expertise (he was a lawyer with knowledge 
on multicurrency mortgages) barred the annulment of the contract on the grounds of mistake. 
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8) In your view, is art. 24 allowing variable interest rates dependant on indexes 
set by a small group of creditors (borrowing rate among them) or would this 
not be an “objective index”? Has this kind of index caused problems in your 
country? Do the provisions in art. 27 improve consumer protection in your 
country?  
With regard to art. 24 MCD, it should be said that most variable interest rates in Spain 
are set against the Euribor and, therefore, colluding practices aside, the index can be 
considered objective. However, the old savings banks183 used their own index, which 
was the average rate of interest for mortgage loans granted in excess of three years for 
the acquisition of residential property, and together with this index other exceptional 
ones subsisted until 1 November 2013, when the Bank of Spain ceased to publish them 
and they were substituted by an average interest rate for mortgage loans in excess of 
three years for the acquisition of residential property granted by Spanish banks.184 
Those indexes were typically higher than the Euribor, but usually no additional 
percentage was added to them or it was much lower than the one added to the 
Euribor. When the Euribor dropped, customers began to wonder why their mortgage 
repayments were not dropping as well, and some challenged these indexes 
successfully, on the grounds of them being unfair terms, since a small number of 
creditors were involved in setting them. Where the challenge is upheld, the credit 
remains interest free.185 As of 1 November 2013, loans subject to the now extinct 
indexes –and not successfully challenged on this account - apply whatever substitute 
index was foreseen in the contract, which in a number of cases has led to the loan 
turning into a fixed interest loan, since the agreed upon ultimate substitute index was 
often the last interest rate applied. Typically, this would mean the fixed interest rate is 
between 3.5 and 4.5%, thus much higher than for existing mortgages indexed to the 
Euribor and higher even than new mortgages at a variable interest, but probably still a 
reasonable fixed interest rate. Where the contract did not provide for a solution, the 
new index published by the Bank of Spain applies, with an added percentage that is 
calculated according to the date of the loan and the difference between the old index 
and the new one.186 
                                                          
183
 Since 2008, and due to the need to restructure the Spanish financial and banking system, most small 
savings banks have been absorbed by banks or have merged to create new banks or have converted the 
old structure into a regular banking company. This has led to an important reduction in the number of 
branches and important staff cuts.  
184
 See Order EHA/2988/2011, art. 27; Circular of the Bank of Spain 5/2012, annex 8, and Law 14/2013, 
27 September, Additional Provision 15 (BOE n. 233, 28 September 2013). 
185
 A quite comprehensive list of judgments declaring these indexes unfair and therefore void, including 
one by a Basque Provincial Court (SAP Álava 10 March 2016, JUR 2016\59148), is available at:  
http://www.irphstop.plazan.net/es/epaitegiak/. 
186
 The Bank of Spain provides an application to calculate it:  
http://app.bde.es/gnt/clientebanca/calculo_diferencial.jsp  
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Quite rarely, some mortgage loans included as a substitute index the average lending 
rate of as little as five lenders. When it came to apply it, three or four of these lenders 
had disappeared and therefore the substitute index was deemed non applicable. We 
do not know of cases where this may have been a problem. 
The scenario described concerning the old indexes may well unfold again if the plans to 
replace Euribor by a different index, due to colluding practices and instability, are 
actually carried out. 
In any event, art. 11 of the Draft Bill basically incorporates art. 24 MCD and, once 
again, it delegates to the Ministry the power to establish the official interest rate 
indexes that may be agreed upon by the parties (it is not clear whether the idea is that 
no other indexes are accepted). 
9) Do provisions on early repayment laid down by art. 25 MCD improve consumer 
protection in your legal system? 
As for early repayment, Spanish legislation stems from the idea that partial or total 
discharge prior to expiry of the credit agreement is possible, because practically all 
mortgage credit agreements include this possibility; if this were not the case, the 
creditor’s consent would be required.187 However, there could be an exception to this 
concerning mortgage loans over homes where the borrower is a natural person or 
where the borrower is a certain type of small company.188 Probably an express 
provision allowing early repayment regardless of the terms of the contract is required 
to adequately transpose the MCD. The Draft Bill (art. 13) correctly addresses the 
matter. 
All the information forms and the binding offer mentioned above demand specification 
of the conditions and commissions, if any, that may apply to early repayment, thus 
taking for granted that the possibility thereof is agreed upon in the contract.  
The commissions are capped, for credit mortgages on homes entered into by natural 
persons or certain small enterprises, since Law 41/2007 came into force, at 0.5% of the 
discharged capital if the discharge takes place during the first five years, or 0.25% if it 
occurs later. Interest risk compensation to the creditor cannot be charged if the 
interest rate is variable and is revised every 12 months or more often (as occurs in the 
vast majority of cases); otherwise, the law lays down systems to calculate the actual 
loss that early repayment has caused the creditor. Probably these provisions are in line 
                                                          
187
  Bank of Spain, Guía de acceso al préstamo hipotecario (2016) 45, available at:  
http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/Secciones/Publicaciones/Folletos/Fic/Guia_hipotecaria_2013.pdf  
188
 Law 41/2007, art. 7, implies that in these cases total or partial early repayment should be accepted, 
even if no agreement to this effect was included in the contract. However, this rule is not highlighted in 
the Bank of Spain’s 2016 Guide (see previous fn.). 
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with the MCD, but the scope thereof should be broadened. The Draft Bill (art. 13) 
simplifies the rules setting the cap on compensation to the creditor and applies them 
to all credits covered by the Draft Bill. 
10) Are there any practices or rules in your country that may interfere with the 
right to enforce recognised to the creditor by art. 26? In the light of your 
mortgage/security system, how relevant is the provision laid down by art. 26.2 
(i.e. if applicable, when is the price for auction or sale set)? 
According to some studies,189 the Spanish mortgage enforcement procedure (arts. 681 
ff. of the Law of Civil Procedure; hereinafter, LEC) is one of the fastest in Europe, 
averaging 10 months between initiation of the proceedings and adjudication of the 
property following the auction.190 Prior to Law 1/2013, proceedings could be started 
upon the first monthly repayment default, and defences were radically limited even in 
comparison with the general enforcement procedures (in essence, the only defences 
available were that the credit or the mortgage had been terminated beforehand or 
that the calculation of the total amount was erroneous). Following the ECJ Aziz case 
(14 March 2013), the Spanish legislature introduced the possibility to allege unfairness 
of contractual terms as a defence, as long as these were the grounds upon which 
enforcement was sought or they determined the amount claimed (art. 695 LEC). This 
means, for instance, that an unfair acceleration clause or an unfair interest rate floor 
or default interest may amount to a successful defence; the former, if unfairness were 
upheld, would lead to termination of the proceedings; the latter, to a new calculation 
of the amount claimed.  
With regard to acceleration clauses, the same Law 1/2013 provided that no mortgage 
credit enforcement proceedings under arts. 681 ff. LEC can be initiated unless a default 
of at least three monthly repayments (or equivalent amount) has occurred, insofar as 
it was thus agreed in the contract and regardless of the fact that the borrower is a 
consumer or not (art. 693 LEC). This has raised the issue as to whether acceleration 
contractual terms providing for early termination upon default of one monthly 
                                                          
189
 P. Kenna; L. Benjaminsen; V. Busch-Geertsema; S. Nasarre-Aznar, Pilot project - Promoting protection 
of the right to housing - Homelessness prevention in the context of evictions, European Commission 
(2016), 69. 
190
 A 2007 study by the European Mortgage Federation (EUROPEAN MORTGAGE FEDERATION (2007). 
Study on the Efficiency of the Mortgage Collateral in the European Union, EMF Publication, which we 
could not access – broken link) stated that the average duration of the specific mortgage enforcement 
procedure in Spain was between 7 and 9 months, according to Miguel García-Posada and Juan S. Mora-
Sanguinetti, authors of the Bank of Spain Study El uso del concurso de acreedores en España, available 
at: 
http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/InformesBoletinesRevistas/BoletinEconomi
co/12/Dic/Fich/be1212-art3.pdf  However, this obviously depends on the particular court’s backlog and 
on the creditor’s interest in moving the procedure forward.  
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repayment (which were the norm prior to Law 1/2013) should be deemed to bar the 
creditor from the privileged mortgage enforcement procedure and also from any other 
form of enforcement grounded on early termination, even if the acceleration clause 
has not been applied by the creditor, provided that the court considers the clause to 
be unfair.191 Leaving this aspect aside, the truth is that in 2007 and 2008, banks 
foreclosed upon one or two monthly repayment defaults; instead, at present it is usual 
for them to wait well in excess of a year. 
On the other hand, different courts have terminated enforcement proceedings when 
the creditor has not proved that, prior to seeking the court’s assistance, it offered the 
client to restructure the loan or cancel the debt in exchange for transfer of the 
mortgaged property (datio in solutum) as per RDL 6/2012 (that is, if the personal and 
economic requirements were met and the creditor had adhered to the Code of Good 
Practices that said piece of legislation provides for).192 Practically all Spanish banks 
have adhered to the Code.193 
Finally, two Catalan provisions must be taken into account.  
First, art. 132-4.3 of the Consumers Code, as amended by Law 20/2014, provides that 
before initiating court procedures to enforce a mortgage credit, the parties must try to 
attain a negotiated solution by means of mediation (which, in reality, is intermediation 
carried out by the Catalan Housing Agency, by delegation of the Catalan Consumers 
Agency). Enforcement proceedings can only be initiated if no agreement has been 
reached in three months. Art. 132-4.3 of the Consumers Code is one of the provisions 
included by Law 20/2014 that the central government challenged before the 
Constitutional Court,194 on the grounds of lack of competence, but it currently applies, 
since the Constitutional Court decided to lift the suspension thereof because it 
                                                          
191
 This issue has reached the ECJ. In its Decisions 11 June 2015 (C-602/13) and 8 July 2015 (C-90/14) it 
clearly states that the fact that an acceleration clause deemed unfair by the court has not been applied 
immediately (i.e. the creditor did not initiate proceedings as soon as default of one or two monthly 
repayments occurred) does not impede the court from extracting all the consequences of the 
declaration of unfairness. This should entail, we believe, that the clause is eliminated from the contract 
and, therefore, the creditor can only claim for the monthly repayments that the debtor has failed to 
meet. However, the Spanish Supreme Court, in its judgment of 18 February 2016, does not share this 
view and even tries to find aspects in the specific mortgage enforcement procedure that are beneficial 
for the consumer. Some authors share the conclusion; see A. Carrasco Perera, ‘Ejecución hipotecaria 
instada sobre la base de una cláusula de vencimiento anticipado que se reputa abusiva, o cada día un 
poco más cerca del abismo’, Gómez-Acebo & Pombo, December 2015, available at:  
http://www.gomezacebo-pombo.com/media/k2/attachments/ejecucion-hipotecaria-instada-sobre-la-
base-de-una-clausula-de-vencimiento-anticipado-que-se-reputa-abusiva-o-cada-dia-un-poco-mas-cerca-
del-abismo.pdf  
192
 Auto AP Huelva (Sec. 2) 23 October 2012; Auto JPI n. 7 Córdova 23 September 2014. 
193
 The list is published in the official journal (BOE n. 101, 28 April 2015) and is available at:  
http://www.mineco.gob.es/stfls/mineco/prensa/ficheros/noticias/2015/Anejo5.pdf  
194
 Constitutional Court 6 October 2015 (BOE n. 242, 9 October 2015). 
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considered that three months is not an excessive delay causing irrevocable 
damages.195  The final decision is still pending. 
Second, Catalan Law 24/2015, also challenged before the Constitutional Court and 
currently suspended in this matter,196 provides for a more relevant obstacle to 
mortgage enforcement proceedings. According to art. 5, creditors who are banks, 
investment funds or asset management companies, as well as any legal entity who 
owns more than 1,250 m2 of habitable property, are not allowed to initiate the specific 
mortgage enforcement proceedings (arts. 681 ff. LEC) unless they have offered 
vulnerable debtors (in the terms of art. 5.10) a “social rent” (which can be very low and 
even 0, as per art. 5.7) for at least three years, and this has been rejected. The act is 
technically abominable (it does not lay down information and cooperation duties upon 
the debtor, it fails to determine when an offer can be deemed rejected, it uses vague 
language mercilessly, and massive concept errors are made) and, due to its 
implications concerning property rights in general, as well as competence issues, it is 
unlikely to be approved by the Constitutional Court. In fact, the Catalan parliament has 
been presented with a Bill  covering the same problem.197 In any event and in the line 
of the typical short-sightedness of most of the Spanish crisis-induced legislation, Law 
24/2015 only bars the specific mortgage enforcement proceedings to creditors who do 
not comply with art. 5, but not other court enforcement channels, such as the general 
enforcement procedure, which under Spanish law is also available to the creditor. 
Therefore, although it is a radical obstacle, probably it does not, in strict terms, 
contravene art. 26 MCD. As to whether Spanish law is consistent with the MCD insofar 
as it allows the creditor to use different enforcement paths, see below Part IV.  
With regards to the rest of art. 26 MCD, certainly Spain needs to improve its systems 
to track what types of immovable property are being used as security, what types of 
contracts are underwritten, what properties are affected by mortgage enforcement 
proceedings and what are the real market prices.198 As shown above, the data even 
now is dispersed and for years it has been impossible to know how many family homes 
banks were foreclosing on. However, market values and market flexibility are not a key 
to the specific mortgage enforcement procedure as per arts. 681 ff. LEC. This is one of 
the peculiarities and, in our view, one of the massive flaws of the system: the auction 
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 Constitutional Court 12 April 2016 (BOE n. 96, 21 April 2016). 
196
 Constitutional Court 24 May 2016 (BOE n. 134, 3 June 2016). 
197
 Projecte de llei de mesures de protecció del dret a l'habitatge de les persones que es troben en risc 
d'exclusió residencial  Available at: http://www.parlament.cat/document/bopc/178437.pdf#page=8  
198
 The Spanish Ministry of Development (Ministerio de Fomento) publishes what are supposed to be 
average housing prices, but at least for the property boom years, they are often lower than the price 
that was really paid (perhaps due to the practice of paying partially in black money, which has now been 
clamped down upon with moderate success). The Ministry’s prices are available at: 
http://www.fomento.gob.es/be2/?nivel=2&orden=35000000  
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value is determined by the value given to the property at the time of entering into the 
mortgage credit agreement, and not the market value at the time of enforcement. This 
benefits borrowers who bought pre-2008, but it can equally be to their detriment 
under normal market conditions, especially if enforcement takes place years after the 
mortgage credit was undertaken. In fact, it may prove detrimental to those who are 
entering into mortgage credit agreements at present, when property prices are low. 
The reason for this rule, exceptional in Europe,199 was to remove any additional time 
and cost obstacles to enforcement by means of this expedite procedure, but whilst it 
may have worked when mortgages had a short duration (i.e. five to seven years) it is 
not justifiable when mortgage credits are granted for over a quarter of a century. We 
believe that the starting price for auction ought to be set against market values at the 
time of enforcement; alternatively, mechanisms should be in place to allow for 
corrections to the original value at the time of enforcement.200 Measures adopted to 
date are insufficient201 and probably the system itself can be deemed contrary to the 
notions underlying the MCD and particularly, art. 26. See also below, part III. 
11) What measures have been adopted to encourage creditors to exercise 
reasonable forbearance before foreclosure (art. 28)? Are they effective? Did 
your system prevent transfer of property in lieu of payment prior to the 
Directive? If a deficiency judgment may be sought after foreclosure, have any 
measures been adopted to ensure that the best efforts price of the property is 
obtained? If these measures had been adopted before the transposition of the 
Directive and regardless of it, you may wish to deal with them below in Part III. 
This question will be dealt with below (Part III). 
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 See A. LUCKOW, Roundtable on flexibility, security and Efficiency of the liens in Europe /rights 
monitoring, Berlin, 2014, slide 10. Available at:  
https://www.pfandbrief.de/cms/_internet.nsf/0/816C4814E95362C0C1257D7900363E24/$FILE/17_10_
2014_Vorstellung_RT-Rechtsmonitoring_Programmrat_Warschau_dt.pdf  
200
 M. Anderson, ‘A general overview of mortgage loans in the context of the crisis in Spain: the effects 
of the mortgage enforcement legal framework and its recent reforms’ (2015) 297 bis Revista de Derecho 
Urbanístico y Medio Ambiente 295-309 at 299; M. Anderson, ‘¿Dación en pago o segunda oportunidad?’, 
in I. Barral; J. Tornos (eds.), Vivienda y crisis: ensayando soluciones (Barcelona: Servicio de Estudios 
Registrales de Cataluña, 2015) 153-167 at 155-156; J.M. Díaz Fraile, ‘La deuda hipotecaria ante su 
ejecución: la tasación del bien hipotecado’, in M. Espejo Lerdo de Tejada; J.P. Murga Fernández (eds.), 
Vivienda, préstamo y ejecución (Pamplona: Aranzadi, 2016) 345-388. 
201
 The entire special mortgage enforcement procedure is tainted by this approach. In a half-hearted 
attempt to respond to the social claim for datio in solutum to be the norm, so that no deficiency 
judgments could be brought after foreclosure, the Spanish legislature, first in 2011 (RDL 8/2011) and 
later in 2013 (Law 1/2013) increased the percentage for which, in the event of there being no 
acceptable bids at auction, the creditor could acquire title of the mortgaged property. Before the 
reforms, this was 50% of the appraisal value at the time of the mortgage loan; at present, it is 70 % (or 
60% if the total debt is under 70%) of the appraisal value, always at the time of the mortgage, when a 
primary home is at stake (art. 671 of the Law on Civil Procedure). These reforms, although they 
obviously reduce deficiency, still rely on false values and lead to confusion and unnecessary complexity. 
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12) Do the provisions regarding charges upon default (art. 28) lead to 
modifications in your system? 
As stated above in Part I, the consequences of declaring a default interest term unfair 
are a matter of discussion in Spain, and the Spanish Supreme Court does not see eye to 
eye with the ECJ.202 In any case, we understand that the MCD allows charges upon 
default to cover (a) the actual costs incurred by the creditor, and (b) a penalty on the 
borrower, which Member States may permit but should place a cap on. Probably this 
ought to amount to the same as if we were applying the general rules on 
compensation for lack of performance. Under the Spanish Civil Code, penalties may be 
moderated by the court (art. 1154, although it is a matter of discussion whether this 
norm would apply to default interest rates). However, this does not seem to be 
sufficient to comply with art. 28.3 MCD, and neither does the already mentioned cap 
introduced by Law 1/2013. According to the new provision of art. 114.III of the Land 
Registration Act,203 default interest rates cannot exceed three times the legal rate of 
interest, but this applies only to mortgages over primary homes and where the 
purpose of the credit is to acquire said primary home. Therefore, it does not cover all 
the mortgage credits within the scope of the MCD, even if Spain made use of the 
exclusion provided for by art. 3.3 (a) MCD. On the other hand, we believe that, 
whatever the cap is set at, the rules on unfair terms and the ECJ’s doctrine should 
continue to apply.  
Part III. Relevant Issues that Directive 2014/17 Does Not Solve 
1. According to art. 28 MCD, creditors should be encouraged to show “reasonable 
forbearance” before foreclosure proceedings are initiated. 
As stated above, the Spanish legislature reacted very late to the mortgage crisis and 
did not begin to introduce provisions to alleviate the position of borrowers until 2011; 
from then on many reforms have taken place, but these do not always respond to the 
same criteria and they may have a different scope. Many of the rules are designed only 
to protect against first home evictions, some require the credit to have been entered 
into precisely to finance the acquisition of said first home and most of the new rules 
apply only when the creditor choses to foreclose following the specific mortgage 
enforcement procedure as per arts. 681 ff. LEC, but not if the general enforcement 
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 See above fn. 50. Academics are recently questioning whether the ECJ’s approach is too extreme; see 
E. Arroyo i Amayuelas, ‘La interacción entre el Derecho europeo y el Derecho nacional en el control de 
las cláusulas contractuales En particular, el control de oficio y la subsistencia del contrato’ (Nomos, 
forthcoming); E. Arroyo i Amayuelas, ‘No vinculan al consumidor las cláusulas abusivas. Del derecho civil 
al procesal y entre la prevención y el castigo’ (Madrid: Marcial Pons, forthcoming). 
203
 Ley hipotecaria, Decree 8 February 1946, which also contains the substantive provisions on 
mortgages. Updated version available at: https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1946-2453. 
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procedure is elected by the creditor. Although the former is the most usual, since it is 
fast and enshrined in the creditors’ systems, reforms should have had a broader scope. 
In any event, a number of provisions have been enacted, with the aim to quiet the 
social complaints concerning a mortgage system that is perceived to be unfair. As well 
as the already mentioned reforms (including those that we have considered when 
dealing with potential obstacles to foreclosure; see above part II), it is now relevant to 
highlight others204: 
a) Probably the most “daring” measure taken by the Government was the 
establishment of a voluntary “Code of Good Banking Practices” by means of 
RDL 6/2012, 9 March, as amended by Law 1/2013 and RDL 1/2015.205 When the 
primary home is mortgaged, the debtor meets certain (rather restrictive) 
economic and personal conditions so as to be considered to risk social 
exclusion, and the creditor has adhered to the Code (the vast majority of 
Spanish credit institutions has done so206), the debtor has the right to require 
the creditor to restructure the debt. This means that, for five years, no principal 
will be repaid and the monthly instalments of the mortgage will comprise 
interest only, at a very low Euribor+0.25%. This can give the debtor a breather, 
not only for the five years (which is relevant enough) but even for when the 
loan recovers its normal functionality after the five years, since the loan has to 
be extended up to 40 years. Thus, usually when mortgage repayment is 
reinstated in full, the monthly instalment may not have increased or may have 
even decreased substantially. If all the conditions are met for this measure to 
apply, the interest rate floor is eliminated for good. However, not a huge 
number of people can benefit from these measures, since another factor plays 
an important role: the purchase price of the property. This aspect has been 
modified various times and now it should finally reflect the differences in 
housing prices throughout Spain, but still the cap is set by reference to the 
tables of prices published by the Ministry of Development,207 which can be 
lower than the actual market price was, especially for those who bought during 
the property boom. In any event, if the debtor is not even able to pay the much 
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 See also S. Nasarre Aznar, ‘A decade of changes in the Spanish mortgage market (2005-2015)’, in T. 
Lasse; A. Lucko; M. Thurner (eds.), Grundpfanrechte in Europa und darüber hinaus (Berlin: Verband 
Deutscher Pfandbriefbanken, 2016) (Band 54) 163 ff.; I. Zurita Martín, ‘Reformas legales hipotecarias en 
España desde el estallido de la crisis’ (2014) 16 Teoría & Derecho. Revista de pensamiento jurídico 53 ff.; 
and H. Simón-Moreno, ‘El cumplimiento del derecho a la vivienda en España. Especial referencia a la 
asequibilidad, estabilidad y accesibilidad en el acceso a la vivienda’ (2015) 169 CEF Legal. Revista 
Práctica de Derecho 105 ff. 
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 BOE n. 60, 10 March 2012; available at:  
https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2012-3394.  
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 The latest list published is available at:  
http://www.mineco.gob.es/stfls/mineco/prensa/ficheros/noticias/2015/Anejo5.pdf  
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reduced monthly interest because that still amounts to more than 50% of the 
household’s income, the creditor may voluntarily remove part of the principal. 
Otherwise, the debtor may force the creditor to accept datio in solutum, 
whereby the mortgaged property is transferred to the creditor in exchange for 
complete discharge of the loan. For some, this reform has put the Spanish 
mortgage law at the vanguard of the European countries as far as the datio in 
solutum is concerned.208 The debtor may also force the creditor to rent the 
property to him for two years and for a limited rent.209 
Since its entry into force, more than 50,000 households have requested the 
application of the Code,210 of which only 23,640 were resolved (the remaining 
applications were rejected). The option that was agreed upon the most was the 
debt restructuring (18,200), followed by the datio in solutum (5,014) and the 
debt removal (6). The European Parliament resolution 8 October 2015211 called 
into question the success of this Code by stating that the Code “has mostly 
been ignored by financial bodies owing to its voluntary status212 and has had 
very limited results in avoiding evictions or prompting ‘datio in solutum’, as the 
eligibility requirements disqualify more than 80 % of those affected”. Be that as 
it may, a number of transfers in payment of debts take place on a voluntary 
basis, i.e. after an agreement between the parties. As a matter of fact, the datio 
in solutum accounted for almost 50% of voluntary assignments of dwellings to 
mortgagees in 2014 and 2013.213 
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 According to a study carried out by the London School of Economics, “Study on means to protect 
consumers in financial difficulty: Personal bankruptcy, datio in solutum of mortgages, and restrictions on 
debt collection abusive practices” (December 2012) 201, “The only country in the world where we can 
identify a weak application of datio in solutum enshrined in legislation is Spain”. This, in our view, is a 
somewhat simplified version of the worldwide solutions in this area. 
209
 However, the rent is set in proportion to the amount owed at the time of the datio in solutum, and 
not in proportion to the family’s income; therefore, it can often be too expensive for the debtor. 
210
 Source: el Derecho 23-10-15, El Código de Buenas Prácticas ha permitido a 23.640 familias 
reestructurar su deuda hipotecaria (http://www.elderecho.com/actualidad/Codigo-Buenas-Practicas-
reestructurar-hipotecaria_0_875625112.html).  
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 European Parliament resolution of 8 October 2015 on mortgage legislation and risky financial 
instruments in Spain (based on petitions received) (2015/2740(RSP)). 
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 This is debatable; as already stated, the fact that adhering to the Code is voluntary for creditors has 
not impeded most of the Spanish credit institutions to adhere to it. A different matter is how they apply 
it. See above fn. 99 and corresponding text, on the number of claims before the Bank of Spain in this 
respect. 
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 Banco de España, Nota informativa sobre los procesos de ejecución hipotecaria sobre viviendas (30 
July 2015). Available at:  
http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/GAP/Secciones/SalaPrensa/NotasInformativas/Briefing_notes/es/notabe
300715.pdf.  
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However, this measure is temporary and crisis-based: it only applies to 
mortgages entered into prior to 10 March 2012. Therefore, it is not a long-term 
solution. On the other hand, it should be noted that no public money goes 
directly into compensating credit institutions for the losses that the application 
of the Code can generate for them. Obviously the banking system has had 
public money injected into it, but not for specific schemes like this one. Thus, as 
in so many instances, it is a scenario where the private parties involved fight to 
preserve their best interests. This is one of the reasons why the application of 
the Code has led to so many claims. 
b) The same year (2012), another measure was introduced: a moratorium on 
evictions (not on foreclosures), for an initial period of two years, which has 
been extended to up to 4.5 years and ends in May 2017 (RDL 27/2012214, 15 
November, repealed by Law 1/2013, as amended by RDL 1/2015). Only debtors 
who meet the conditions to be considered in risk of social exclusion (currently 
similar to those laid down for the application of the Code of Good Banking 
Practices) and who have lost their primary home through a mortgage 
enforcement proceeding following arts. 681 ff. LEC can apply for the 
moratorium. A study carried out by FUNCAS concluded that this measure would 
have little impact in practice (it would affect only 0.9% of all households based 
on the economic requirements eventually laid down by Law 1/2013)215, so the 
success of this measure may be called into question. In any event, this is a type 
of solution that satisfies no-one. The debtor has lost title to his home and 
cannot recover it unless his fortune unexpectedly turns and he is able to 
repurchase it. On the other hand, the creditor has acquired a property (for 
which provisions will be in place) that cannot be accessed but has to be 
maintained; taxes upon it need to be paid, and no rent whatsoever will be 
received.  
What will happen come May 2017 remains to be seen. 
In any event, it seems clear to us that these measures are temporary and crisis-
oriented; they do not ensure that the creditor shows “reasonable forbearance” prior 
to foreclosure. No mechanism providing for compulsory mediation or intermediation 
before initiating proceedings is in place; the Draft Bill formally allows adhesion to the 
Consumer Arbitration System, but does not impose it; the Catalan provision on 
compulsory mediation (Consumers Code, art. 132-4.3) is in force, but it has been 
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 BOE n. 276, 16 November 2012; available at:  
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 M. Romero, ‘Desahucios y dación en pago: estimación del impacto sobre el sistema bancario’ (2013) 
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challenged by the Spanish Government before the Constitutional Court. Other 
measures that delay the initiation of proceedings, stay the eviction or may render the 
proceedings longer do not ensure that the creditor behaves proactively to search an 
alternative solution, as per recital 27 MCD. However, perhaps the MCD itself can be 
blamed for being too vague and too uncompromising in this respect. 
On the other hand, the Spanish legislation does not promote coordination between 
the courts and social services so as to detect situations where there is a risk of social 
exclusion and where public housing ought to be allocated prior to eviction. However, 
some courts and some social services have established informal channels of 
communication and, in some instances, the judicature has reached cooperation 
agreements with regional and local authorities to this effect (this is the case in 
Andalusia, where an agreement between the Consejo General del Poder Judicial, the 
Andalusian Government and the federation of municipalities is in place since 1 March 
2016).  
2. According to art. 28.5 MCD, “where after foreclosure proceedings outstanding debt 
remains, Member States shall ensure that measures to facilitate repayment in order to 
protect consumers are on place”.  
The leitmotif of the social protest against the mortgage foreclosure system was that 
there should be no deficiency judgment once the creditor has acquired title to the 
property. Datio in solutum was perceived to be the ideal remedy; it was held that 
deeds in lieu of payment should be imposed on the creditor under all circumstances. 
The system was perceived to be unfair insofar as “the bank had appraised the 
property” at a higher value than the value it was deemed to acquire it upon 
foreclosure and then, on top of having lost the property, the debtor was left with very 
large outstanding obligations. The false basis upon which the auction system operates 
(as described below, and in Part IV and footnote 200) did not contribute to clarify the 
technical functioning of securities, as ancillary to the main obligation, and a certain 
“consumer irresponsibility” can be detected in many instances (the debtor is happy to 
gain when the value of the property goes up, but thinks that he should not be asked to 
honour the obligations arising from the loan if the value drops). Moreover, the social 
movement was radically opposed to negotiating loan restructuring with the credit 
institutions, which were perceived to be the enemy and 100% responsible for the 
debtor’s predicament. In our view, compulsory datio in solutum is not the adequate 
solution from many perspectives (it is inconsistent with the concept of real securities; 
it interferes with the normal operation of banking and it promotes irresponsible 
and/or opportunistic behaviour from borrowers, as well as lying the entire risk of 
property market fluctuation on the creditor), but perhaps the most definitive reason is 
that it is not the best solution for the debtor either in most cases: the property is 
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surrendered irrevocably to the creditor; except for speculative investments, one would 
think that retaining the asset (especially if it is the family home) would be the 
preferred option. 
In any event, the Spanish legislature has made certain concessions to these claims, but 
has not (and is not foreseen to) adopt such a radical measure. Some of the reforms in 
this respect have already been mentioned. For instance, the percentage by which the 
creditor may acquire title to the property in the event of there being no acceptable 
bids at the auction, which was initially 50% for any type of property, was raised in 2011 
and later in 2013 so that it is now, 70% (or 60%) of the appraisal value at the time of 
entering into the mortgage loan when the debtor’s habitual home is concerned; the 
higher this value is, the lower the outstanding debt after foreclosure. Caps on default 
interest rates and on costs have the same effect when the primary home is concerned. 
For certain debtors and insofar as a number of other requirements are met, the 2012 
Code on Good Banking Practices provides for mandatory datio in solutum, as already 
explained. 
Neither the Spanish legislature nor the MCD provide for effective measures to 
encourage creditors to voluntarily accept datio in solutum. The MCD will have 
disappointed many by merely forbidding that voluntary dation in solutum is eliminated 
from the system. 
But there are still other measures that may fall within the requirements of art. 28.5 
MCD. We will mention three. 
a) In 2011 (RDL 8/2011, 1 July216) increased the threshold from which income can 
be seized in deficiency judgments following foreclosure of the primary home by 
means of the special mortgage enforcement procedure of arts. 681 ff. LEC. This 
raises the question as to why the same increase does not apply when the 
mortgagee has followed the general enforcement procedure and why is it 
worse to have one’s income seized after losing the family home and not if 
foreclosure affected other assets (perhaps the debtor rented his home 
anyway). 
b) One of the reforms introduced by Law 1/2013 included provisions on debt 
release in art. 579.2 LEC in the event of a deficiency judgement been sought. 
According to this article, the outstanding debt may be reduced by 35% if the 
debtor pays the remaining 65% within 5 years following the auction – or it may 
be reduced by 20% if the debtor manages to pay 80% within 10 years. This only 
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applies when the primary home has been foreclosed upon, and it does not stay 
the enforcement proceedings (if the debtor pays in excess of the amounts 
stated above, the excess will be returned to him). In the normal scenario, 
debtors who have lost their family homes are nowhere near to being in a 
position to pay these amounts. 
c) Finally, RDL 1/2015, 27 February,217 and Law 25/2015, 28 July,218 amended the 
Spanish Bankruptcy Act 22/2003, allowing the individual debtor to be 
exonerated from unsatisfied debts once the bankruptcy procedure is 
concluded. Unlike companies, which are dissolved and liquidated in the 
insolvency proceedings, insolvent (natural persons) debtors were left with 
pending debts even after bankruptcy. No fresh start option was in place for 
them up until the 2015 reforms, in spite of the fact that it had been envisaged 
as a necessary modification of the system at least since 2011 (additional 
provision 2 bis, Law 22/2003, introduced by Law 38/2011, 10 October). The 
new framework provides for a notarised mechanism by means of which the 
debtor seeks to reach an agreement with the creditors; if such an agreement is 
not possible, the insolvency proceeding takes place – albeit slightly faster than 
in the normal scenario – and if it concludes with remaining debt, the debtor 
may apply to the court for the “benefit of debt exoneration”. If certain 
requirements are met (the law establishes a list of conditions that define what 
it considers to be a bona fides debtor) and the debtor presents a plan designing 
how debts are to be paid, the debtor will be definitely exonerated after 5 years 
if: a) the plan has been complied with; or b) the debtor has destined at least 
half of the income exceeding the amount that cannot be seized to paying the 
debts (or a quarter of that income if the debtor meets the requirements laid 
down by RDL 6/2012). Because this procedure is an insolvency procedure and 
this area of law is remarkably complex, it is not certain that it will appeal to 
many debtors, especially when they have one main creditor (the mortgagee) 
and perhaps a few other minor debts. Although it grants the possibility to 
actually start afresh, perhaps it does not fit in with the Spanish social and 
cultural makeup. 
We think the Spanish Government must believe that these reforms already comply 
with art. 28.5 MCD, which again is too vague in its wording. We are not sure whether 
the measures in place in Spain do actually prevent long-term over-indebtedness 
(recital 27). However, it should also be borne in mind that the more the creditors’ 
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position is debilitated and risk allocated to them, the more difficult it will be to obtain 
financing in order, for instance, to purchase a primary home. Since rent is not an 
affordable and stable enough alternative in Spain, the approach to these issues needs 
to be adequately balanced and reforms must be designed to endure both periods of 
growth and of recession. 
3. The MCD does not touch upon unfair contractual terms, since this is the scope of 
Directive 93/13/EU. However, the amount of requests for preliminary rulings 
submitted by the Spanish courts to the ECJ219 suggest that the issue of unfair terms is 
not properly solved, either from a domestic point of view (see above on the amount of 
time it can take for a case to be decided and for a firm declaration of unfairness to 
reach notaries and land registrars) or from the European one. Many reforms have 
been carried out in this area, as shown throughout the report, which have often been 
prompted by the ECJ’s rulings and doctrine, but still new problems arise constantly. It 
does not help that the MCD does nothing towards standardising (or at least defining) a 
minimum content for mortgage loans. Instead, the Spanish Draft Bill does suggest 
(arts. 5.1.a) and 12) that the Ministry of Economy should lay down what is to be 
considered the essential content of such agreements, as well as the ancillary terms 
they may include. It is one of the few instances (as well as with regards to the scope of 
the protective measures) where Spain appears to go further than the MCD demands. 
4. In relevant areas covered by the MCD, it appears to be either too vague (art. 28 is an 
example of this, as already mentioned) or to impose many obligations, but leave 
remedies entirely down to domestic law. Such is the case with the creditworthiness 
assessment, the pre-contractual information or the independence of advisory services. 
Although many Directives follow the same pattern, it seems clear that a European 
solution against breach of its own norms would be more efficient, so as to avoid 
Member States from considering, for example, that administrative sanctions are 
sufficient in all instances. 
5. On the other hand, certain issues, such as secutitisation or the modification of 
existing mortgage loans, are not specifically addressed by the MCD. Although we 
understand that the latter is included in its scope, the problems that can arise in a few 
years in Spain due to the amount of mortgage loans that have been restructured or 
refinanced would have called, we feel, for closer attention. 
6. As a sign of feeble consumer protection, it is surprising that art. 11.6 MCD does not 
make it mandatory for domestic legislation to include warnings related to the risk of 
losing the property in the event of default, as well as to the possibility of deficiency 
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judgments being sought. Catalan Law 20/2014 did require such warnings to be 
included in advertising. 
7. Despite the constant efforts made, since the 1960’s, towards creating a 
Eurohypothec (a common mortgage for Europe)220 little development was achieved at 
EU level. This is even more relevant when considering that 51% of the European GDP is 
composed by mortgage loans, which makes it difficult to understand the idea of a 
“common internal market” if harmonization or, at least, convergence relates only to 
the other 49%. In this sense, two studies carried out by the London School of 
Economics
221 in 2005 and Mercer Oliver Wyman in 2003222 showed the benefits of 
harmonising the European mortgage market. The Green Paper on EU mortgage loans 
in 2005223 asked countries and stakeholders about the idea of the eurohypothec, with 
massively positive answers. Following the 2007 White Paper,224 all the goals to be 
achieved by the eurohypothec were present but the institution itself was paradoxically 
and unjustifiably abandoned. Indeed, neither consumers nor lenders obtain the legal 
certainty needed to carry out cross-border mortgage loans. Since then, seven years of 
discussions in relation to the mortgage market seem to have ended up in the “de-
caffeinated” Mortgage Credit Directive which has little to do with the harmonization or 
convergence of mortgage markets in Europe and more to do with consumer 
protection, a traditional field of legislation developed by the EU. As a result, it does not 
come as a surprise that the Report Border Acquisitions of Residential Property: 
Problems that Arise for Citizens
225 strongly recommended regarding the MCD as the 
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“Resuscitation of the proposal for a common mortgage instrument for Europe (the 
Eurohypothec) to facilitate cross-border mortgage lending operations”.  
Part IV. Conclusions 
Having worked on the Directive for a few months, we feel that little is achieved by it 
and we are still not sure whether it really is (as stated above) a mere consumer 
protection norm, in the line of so many other EU enactments, or rather an instrument 
to protect the banking system against its own reckless behaviour. In any event, 
consumer protection has always been conceived as an instrument to attain an efficient 
internal market, and not necessarily a goal in itself. 
In our view, the Directive brings modifications in different areas, but it is so vague 
when it (partially) addresses especially relevant issues; Member States may consider 
that most of the reforms required by it are already in place or may ignore what could 
lead to important changes. 
In fact, its “star” (the ESIS) is only mentioned in passing in the Spanish Draft Bill dated 
26 July 2016 and it will be down to the Ministry of Economy to approve whatever 
changes are necessary in the existing pre-contractual information sheets (very inspired 
already by the 2011 MCD Proposal). In other areas, such as staff remuneration, the 
Spanish Draft Bill takes a restrictive view of the reform – and perhaps the wording of 
the Directive allows it. Such a relevant aspect as the creditworthiness assessment is 
also left in the hands of the Ministry, so not much more than an administrative 
sanction is to be expected if the creditor grants the loan in spite of a negative or 
inadequately carried out assessment. 
In light of the Draft Bill, we do not expect the Spanish legislature to undertake a serene 
and profound analysis of the mortgage system and consider its possible 
comprehensive review. The Draft Bill does not intend to put some order in the amount 
of rules that have been produced since the crisis, with different scopes, diverse effects 
and poor drafting. It does not decide whether mortgages over primary homes require 
a separate treatment or not (we believe solutions should be found elsewhere, but 
multiple post-crisis rules refer only to primary homes in the context of mortgage 
enforcement); it does not make an effort to adapt consumer protection norms to the 
mortgage market and it generally stems from the idea that no major changes are 
required, save for certain aspects of the regulation of intermediaries, representatives 
and advisory services and staff remuneration. The Draft Bill does not question a 
mortgage system that has generally been considered to have failed when faced with a 
sharp recession. Perhaps the system is not as bad as it is sometimes portrayed to be, 
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but the analysis should be undertaken whatsoever. It is probably true, though, that the 
MCD does not impose it. Thus, it is just another missed opportunity. 
Before the Draft Bill was published, we had had the chance to point out some of the 
problems of the Spanish mortgage system that should be addressed. The MCD does 
not impose direct obligations in these areas, but it can be held that Spanish law is not 
in line with its underlying principles (or mere assumptions). 
First, as already explained, in our view the MCD assumes that the value of the property 
for foreclosure purposes is the market value at the time of enforcement. This is not the 
case in Spain and a reform is necessary. Although seized properties are appraised if a 
creditor initiates a general enforcement procedure, the same does not apply when the 
creditor chooses to follow the special mortgage enforcement procedure laid down by 
arts. 681 ff. LEC. In this case, the value of the property for auction purposes needs to 
have been set at the time when the mortgage agreement was entered into (or 
modified later). Therefore, all values are, by definition, false at the time of 
enforcement and no mechanisms are in place to correct this. Law 1/2013 modified art. 
682 LEC requiring appraisal by a recognised appraisal company and provided that the 
value for auction purposes could not be lower than 75% of the appraisal. However, this 
rule was modified by Law 19/2015 and now it is not clear whether this rule applies 
only where creditors securitise mortgages.226 In any event, the new rule has the 
advantage – if applied universally – of impeding agreements whereby the value given 
to the property equalled the amount loaned, however low this were. But it is still an 
outdated evaluation and it may be detrimental to the debtor, since a further 30% or 
40% (for primary homes) or 50% (for other properties) reduction over that value will 
be applied at auction, this being especially negative when the creditor acquires the 
property due to there not being acceptable bids (arts. 670 and 671 LEC).227 Moreover, 
the same property will have different starting prices at auction depending on the 
procedure that is followed and this price will not correspond to the (updated) one it 
would be given in insolvency proceedings (art. 94.5 Law 22/2003). We strongly believe 
that in this respect Spanish legislation needs to be brought into line with that of all 
other EU countries. 
Second, we have just mentioned that the creditor may choose what procedural path to 
follow upon default. The most generalised route is the special mortgage enforcement 
procedure laid down by arts. 681 ff. LEC, but the creditor may decide to use a general 
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procedure on the merits or (and this is more likely) the general enforcement 
procedure (arts. 517 ff. LEC). This means that the creditor may choose to address 
enforcement against all the debtor’s assets and not only against the mortgaged 
property. Also, the creditor may choose to enforce against personal guarantors instead 
of foreclosing on the mortgaged property. We believe that the MCD (especially art. 
28.5) assumes that the mortgaged property will be foreclosed upon first. Even if this is 
perhaps arguable, it would have been a good opportunity to decide whether the 
choice that Spanish law allows for is justified or not. We believe that in normal 
scenarios it can be, but, once again, it looks like the debate simply will not take place. 
In this line of missed opportunities, Spain should also question whether auction is the 
adequate mechanism to obtain the best efforts price for the property. In practice it has 
not been and, in spite of recent reforms addressed at promoting electronic auctions,228 
it is probably fair to say that the general feeling is that private (supervised) sales would 
render better results for all parties concerned. However, the Spanish legislature still 
clings to auctions.229 Especially at a time when the property market is still very slow, 
other mechanisms should be considered. 
To sum up, we hoped that, using the MCD as an excuse, a more profound debate on 
different aspects of the mortgage loan system would ensue. Disperse and (mostly) 
provisional reforms (such as the already mentioned moratorium on evictions or the 
Code on Good Banking Practices) are not sufficient.230 However, since the Directive is 
not assertive enough, it would probably be asking too much to go further than the 
actual EU has dared to go. 
 
 
 
Este obra está bajo una licencia de Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-
SinObraDerivada 4.0 Internacional. 
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ANNEX I 
FIPRE (Pre-contractual information sheet as per Order EHA/2899/2011) 
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ANNEX II 
FIPER (Personalised information sheet as per Order EHA/2899/2011) 
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